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Abstract
Imagine the situation in which an econometrician can infer the distribution of wel-
fare gains induced by the provision of higher education financial aid using survey data
obtained from a set of individuals, and can estimate the same distribution using a highly
incentivized field experiment in which the same set of individuals participated. In the
experimental setting relying on incentivized choices, making the wrong decision can be
costly. In the survey, the stakes are null and reporting false intentions and expectations
is costless. In this paper, we evaluate the extent to which the decomposition of the two
welfare gain distributions into latent factors are coherent. We find that individuals often
put a much different weight to a specific set of determinants in the experiment and in the
survey and that the valuations of financial aid are rank incoherent. About 66% of Biased
Incoherency (defined as the tendency to have a higher valuation rank in the experiment
than in the survey) is explained by individual heterogeneity in subjective benefits, costs
and other factors and about half of these factors affect the welfare gains of financial aid
in the survey and in the experiment in opposite directions. Ex-ante policy evaluation of
a potential expansion of the Canadian higher education financial aid system may there-
fore depend heavily on whether or not the data have been obtained in an “incentivized”
context.
JEL Codes: I2, C91, C93, D12, D9, D91.
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1 Introductory Comments
In this paper, we make use of a unique data set that combines rich survey data on Canadian
high school students’ perceptions of the costs and benefits to higher education, cognitive
and non-cognitive skills as well as financial and informational constraints with a high-stake
field experiment that elicits their willingness-to-pay for financial aid. Exploiting these two
data sources, we can estimate the distribution of welfare gains induced by financial aid
and assess to what extent they differ depending on the measurement tool being used.
To obtain the first distribution, we estimate the subjective ex-ante valuation of higher
education from survey data and use the parameters to construct counterfactual welfare
gains induced by the provision of higher education financial aid offers identical to those
found in a field experiment. Our analysis distinguishes between university (requiring 4
years) or other types of post-secondary education such as community college and the like
(requiring 2 years).
To construct the model, we assume that some primitive latent factors (cognitive and
non-cognitive skills, knowledge about the labor market and financial aid opportunities)
are mapped onto qualitative perceptions about the cost and the benefits (both pecuniary
and non-pecuniary) of higher education through a recursive factor structure. In turn,
these components are mapped onto structural elements of the intertemporal utility of
attending higher education to be estimated. Using out of sample information about life-
cycle consumption of Canadians who have not attended higher education, we first estimate
the expected utility of attending either type of higher education in the future under the
status-quo (outside the experiment) using survey and recover the welfare gains induced
by accepting hypothetical financial aid.
To obtain the second distribution, we use data taken from the field experiment to
estimate directly the welfare gains of actual generous financial aid offers disclosed by a
large number of binary decisions between immediate cash payments and financial aid for
the same individuals.1 It is then possible to measure the coherency between two candidate
distributions originating from the same individuals.
In our opinion, this is a crucial undertaking which may deliver important implications
for education policies. Financial aid expansions are regularly debated as a tool to promote
access to higher education for all. However, little is known about the welfare gains induced
by the provision of financial aid for students. One important challenge is the measurement
of such gains. Suppose that a policy analyst is interested in evaluating the impact of
an expansion in higher education financial aid on university vs. other post-secondary
enrollments, and assume that he/she can access data from the survey or from the field
experiment. Among other things, the analyst would want to know if those who are
endowed with a high utility (or high return) to two-year college investment have a different
valuation of financial aid than those with a propensity to choose a university curriculum,
or to what extent individual valuations of financial aid may depend on individual latent
factors. This could be achieved with the survey as well as with the experiment.2 Ideally,
conclusions drawn from one source of data should also be valid with the other as they
1In the terminology of Harrison and List (2004), the experiment can be categorized as an artefactual
field experiment.
2As far as we know, economists have never estimated formally how financial aid generosity impacts
on the odds ratio of choosing 2-year college vs. 4-year curriculum. While this is not the objective of our
paper, decomposition of individual valuations in terms of subjective costs and benefits could be a useful
step toward understanding who benefits from financial aid.
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contain information and choices of the same individuals.
One major challenge that we face is to design an approach that circumvents potential
scale differences in cardinal utilities between the survey and the experiment because val-
uations in the experiment are benchmarked with respect to the utility of an immediate
cash payment and therefore depend on a reference consumption level which must be es-
timated. On the other hand, valuations obtained from the survey are about hypothetical
future payoffs regardless of immediate consumption and are expressed in reference to a
given lifecycle consumption profile which cannot be introduced explicitly in the model of
individual choices taking place in the experiment.
One implication of this contextual difference between the survey and the experiment
is that it is unrealistic to compare point estimates of the intertemporal valuation of ad-
ditional financial aid measuring welfare gains. Instead of performing a simple evaluation
strategy based on summary statistics such as the average of individual welfare gains,
we search for the determinants of individual financial aid valuations and try to detect
incoherencies in the mapping from type specific factors onto type specific valuations.
To achieve our goals, we must work with the mapping from individual ranks in costs,
benefits and other factors onto financial aid valuation ranks. Despite the contextual
differences aforementioned, if valuations obtained from the survey and the experiment
are coherent, the mapping from factor ranks onto valuation ranks obtained from the
survey should be the same as that obtained from the experiment.
As will become clear later, with our approach it is possible to distinguish between
“Absolute” incoherency and “Biased” incoherency. The former is defined as the tendency
for individual valuations to be ranked differently in the experiment than in the survey and
is of little interest to us. The latter is defined as the propensity for individual valuations to
be systematically ranked higher in the experiment than in the survey and is the measure
of incoherency that we focus upon.
As we use latent factor techniques to isolate the key determinants of the valuation of fi-
nancial aid in the survey and in the experiment, evaluating individual (or type) coherency
requires lots of data. Survey data disclose information about student cognitive and non-
cognitive skills, financial situations (liquidity constraint expectations), information about
the labor market, and other relevant pieces of information. On top of this, students are
asked to provide qualitative subjective valuations of monetary and non-monetary benefits
and costs of education, as well as higher education attendance intentions (university or
other types of post-secondary education). With these data, we can decompose the life-
time ex-ante utility of higher education into 6 dimensions: monetary costs, non-monetary
(psychic) costs, monetary benefits, non-monetary benefits, a reference consumption level
(depending on financial constraint and information about financial aid) and the consump-
tion value of attending either type of higher education and easily characterize the ex-ante
valuation of higher education under the status-quo.
The financial aid experiment consists of a sequence of 12 choices between a cash pay-
ment to be paid within one week and generous higher education financial aid conditional
on future enrollment. It therefore varies both the cost of education by providing financial
aid (loan or grant) ahead of enrollment and the opportunity cost of accepting financial
aid. Choices exerted in the financial aid experiment identify the intertemporal gain of
accepting financial aid (the difference between the futures components of two value func-
tions), which depends itself on the same parameters characterizing the subjective returns
to higher education.
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One key distinction between survey data and the field experiment is the amount of in-
centives involved. Survey data contain self-reported elements obtained without providing
any incentive as is commonly done in the literature.3 On the contrary, the financial aid
experiment is highly incentivized. Many decisions involve a choice between a high cash
payment and a generous financial aid offer. For instance, some of the financial aid offers
can cover between 25% and 50% of total 4-year university tuition at top universities in
Canada, or close to 100% of the total 2-year community college tuition, while cash offers
may be as high as $700. In the experimental setting, any decision made on the basis
of false or unreliable parameters could turn out to be very costly as the immediate cash
payments act as shadow prices. In the survey, disclosing abnormally high (or low) cost or
benefit of higher education, or stating erroneous intentions would be costless.4
Although our primary objective is to evaluate how economic parameters estimated in
a context where stakes are very large may differ from those obtained in an incentive-free
setting (such as in survey data), our paper also contributes to various branches of the
literature on education decisions and in particular, to the more recent literature on higher
education financial aid. Those are reviewed in the next section.
The main results may be summarized as follows. Overall, we find relatively strong
evidence of individual (or type) incoherency between information disclosed in the survey
and choices exerted in the experiment when choices have a high opportunity cost. Beliefs
and intentions revealed in the survey imply a very high valuation of higher education
(especially university), very high hypothetical attendance probabilities, and a particularly
important role played by non-financial dimensions. This implies that providing generous
grants (reducing the cost of higher education) or generous loans remains ineffective at
raising enrollments but raises welfare mostly by raising consumption during education.
Indeed, an econometrician estimating a behavioral model from the survey could conclude
that expanding financial aid programs would generate modest benefit over the lifecycle.
However, when estimating the valuation of financial aid from the experiment, we find
a disconnection with individual valuations obtained from the survey. This is exemplified
by the rank correlations between individual valuations of a given type of financial aid,
which are generally low (between 0.3 and 0.4). This leads us to investigate the reasons
explaining this low level of coherency.
Our investigation of the relationships between valuation ranks and factor ranks in
the survey and in the experiment indicates that incoherency is not driven by purely
stochastic components such as random errors independent from individual heterogeneity.
Instead, incoherency is strongly correlated with heterogeneity measured by various latent
factors. About 66% of Biased Incoherency (the tendency to have a higher valuation
rank in the experiment than in the survey) is explained by individual heterogeneity in
subjective benefits, costs and other factors. A precise decomposition of the individual
valuations using rank-rank relationships indicates that about half of these factors affect
the welfare gains of financial aid in the survey and in the experiment in opposite directions.
This is particularly true about university monetary benefits, university monetary costs,
post-secondary monetary benefits, post-secondary non-monetary costs, which appear to
3In the next section, we review the relevant literature.
4Another approach would be to treat the survey and the field experiment as complementary sources of
information enabling identification of parameters otherwise unindentifiable. In recent years, a relatively
large number of papers have made used of experimental data in order to perform structural estimation.
As documented in Todd and Wolpin (2021), many of these papers exploit the advantages and ameliorate
the disadvantages of each approach.
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constitute incoherent determinants of both loan and grant valuations.
By grouping determinants according to different dimensions such as (i) monetary vs.
non-monetary determinants, (ii) university costs and benefits vs. post-secondary costs
and benefits, (iii) all benefits and costs vs other factors, and finally (iv) all benefits vs.
all costs, it becomes relatively clear that individuals often put a much different weight
to one set of determinants in the experiment and in the survey. For instance, we find
that individual beliefs about university benefits and costs play a much higher role in the
valuations inferred from the experiment than those obtained in the survey.
To the extent that one is willing to attach more reliability to data obtained in a high-
stake context than in an incentive-free setting, our findings cast serious doubts about
the validity of inference drawn from an incentive-free setting and indicate that ex-ante
policy evaluation coming from it should also be questioned. To see this, reconsider the
hypothetical case where an economist is interested in evaluating ex-ante the impact of
an expansion in higher education financial aid on university vs other post-secondary en-
rollments such as 2-year colleges, but can only access data from the survey or from the
field experiment. Estimating the determinants of individual valuations (essentially the
willingness to pay for financial aid), could constitute a natural step as it should disclose if
those who are willing to pay more are those with high ex-ante probabilities of attending
2-year colleges or with high ex-ante probability to enroll in a university.
When using the survey, our estimates indicate that those endowed with higher mon-
etary benefits and costs of a university curriculum would benefit more from financial aid
expansion. However, estimates obtained in the experiment point to the exact opposite,
as those with higher cost and benefits of university attendance are those benefiting the
less. While we recognize that predicting the impact of a new policy may require more
information than the valuation decompositions into costs and benefits only, it is clear that
the latter constitute valuable information. However, in this specific context, it would be
impossible to reconcile the results obtained from the survey with those obtained in the
experiment. As will become clear later, this sort of problem affects other determinants as
well, and depending on which one the analyst is focusing upon, policy conclusions would
depend on whether or not the data have been obtained in an “incentivized” context.
The remaining portion of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the
background literature and our contributions. A description of survey data and the field
experiment are found in Section 3. The statistical model used for measuring individual
factors is found in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the identification and estimation of
the structural parameters of the model of the ex-ante value of higher education estimated
from the survey, which is used to generate the distribution of financial aid valuations
in the survey. In Section 6, we present the model explaining decisions exerted within
the experiment and discuss the distribution of financial aid valuations. Section 7 is de-
voted to the confrontation of the two candidate distributions of the value of financial aid.
Concluding remarks are found in Section 8.
2 Contribution and Background Literature
Our paper contributes to various branches of economics which study the reliability of
economic preferences (or skills) obtained in contexts that differ according to the level of
incentives involved. Although the literature is in its infancies, it already incorporates
diverse applications and approaches which are difficult to unify. We now briefly review
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some of the most important.
First, there are instances where potential incoherencies may be explained by the con-
flict between disclosing attitudes (or opinions) that are in line with mainstream views
(usually in surveys) and taking individual decisions that may be costly. In other words,
individuals may not behave coherently when they do not have to back-up self-reported
choices with actual actions. Many studies in environmental economics detected differ-
ences between stated valuations of prospective regulatory changes and actual individual
behavior.5 In our paper, we refer to this sort of incoherency, arising when hypothetical
actions and actual choices are systematically different, as “Biased Incoherency”.
The existence of individual incoherencies across contexts is also particularly acute
when estimating deep preference parameters, and in particular, when estimating risk
aversion. As many studies use answers to hypothetical situations involving risk (thereby
potentially creating a potential “Hypothetical Bias”) while others infer risk aversion from
individual choices involving actual payoffs (mostly within a lab experiment), it is impor-
tant to assess the extent to which both approaches lead to similar answers. Reviewing
the literature on the estimation of risk aversion is beyond the scope of this paper, but
Heckman, Jagelka, and Kautz (2019) discuss the notion of “hypothetical bias” and review
various approaches and their link to quantitative psychology. As of now, there seems to
be no consensus about the sign of the bias induced by choices exerted within hypothetical
situations.
In consumer choice theory, individual incoherencies may be explained by erratic be-
havior caused by endogenous levels of attention in problem solving. Stochastic behavior
has attracted attention in a recent literature concerned with the theoretical foundations of
discrete choice models and economists have introduced concepts such as Rational Inatten-
tion (Matějka and McKay, 2015), Rational Imprecision (Steverson, Brandenburger, and
Glimcher, 2019), or Limited Attention (Barseghyan, Molinari, and Thirkettle, 2021).6 In
line with these concepts, econometricians concerned with the structural modeling of the
sources of stochastic behavior in the lab (such as reverting choices within a Multiple price
List setting) and how it relates to economic incentives, have pointed out the need to
separate parameters capturing noise and effort from true preferences.7
Finally, and as pointed out in Heckman, Jagelka, and Kautz (2019), a substantial
number of researchers in Psychology and Economics have documented the existence of a
strong dependence between achievements and incentives through the impact of incentive
on effort. In a recent paper, Gneezy et al. (2019) show that US students improve perfor-
mance on standardized tests substantially in response to incentives, while Chinese stu-
dents do not seem to be affected. Their findings therefore strongly question the validity of
international comparisons of education systems based on standardized test achievements.
In the current paper, we build on ideas found in these various segments of the literature,
but use structural econometric techniques to uncover the nature and the determinants of
incoherencies (if any) between the distribution of parameters obtained from the survey and
from the experiment. To our knowledge, our paper is the first that uses structural methods
in order to estimate the degree of coherency between economic parameters estimated from
survey data obtained in an incentive-free environment and the same parameters obtained
5See Arrow et al. (1993) for a discussion of environmental policy regulations.
6The literature on behavioral inattention is summarized in Gabaix (2019).
7Many of these issues are detailed in Jagelka (2020), Belzil and Jagelka (2020) and Andersson et al.
(2020).
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from a highly incentivized field experiment.
Because our paper measures individual coherency from data on schooling subjective
valuations and financial aid decisions, it also contributes to the literature on modeling
education decisions. Our paper is the first to estimate subjective valuation of higher
education using data in which both monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits are
elicited using qualitative (ordered) measures. Indeed, the decomposition of the lifetime
ex-ante utility of higher education into 6 components has no pendant in the literature since
no study has ever been able to decompose the intertemporal utility of higher education
into that many separate components.
While our approach makes use of data that are normally used by those using the elici-
tation approach, it differs substantially from papers found in the literature.8 For instance,
in Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang (2012) and Wiswall and Zafar (2015), monetary returns
are elicited and non-monetary returns are inferred as residual parameters. In others, such
as Boneva and Rauh (2019), non-pecuniary returns are elicited but the distinction be-
tween benefits and costs is ignored. The data used in this paper allow us to make use of
a more disaggregated monetary and non-monetary motive measurements than is usually
done in the literature as the measures are sub-divided in their cost and benefit dimension.
In turn, those allow us to distinguish between higher education amenities reaped beyond
graduation and amenities captured during education (the consumption value).9
As far as we know, our paper is also one of the first that treats self-reported qualita-
tive valuations as noisy objects, thereby separating true individual beliefs from statistical
noise, and maps these factors into structural parameters that admit a monetary inter-
pretation. Until now, virtually all papers estimating models from elicited beliefs have
abstracted from measurement errors.10
Finally, our paper contributes indirectly and to a lesser extent to the growing literature
on the evaluation of higher education financial aid policies. As far as we know, the only
structural paper concerned with higher education financial aid is Belzil, Maurel, and
8The first generation of schooling models (assuming Rational Expectation) were based on the premise
that agents’ subjective beliefs about the economic return to schooling coincide with the parameters
that may be identified from observational data on schooling and earnings and the estimation therefore
requires to use those parameters as input to the solution of the dynamic programming problem of the
agent. This approach, followed in a seminal paper by Keane and Wolpin (1997), but also in several
other contributions such as Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Keane and Wolpin (2001), Belzil and Hansen
(2002), Heckman and Navarro (2007) and, more recently, Todd and Zhang (2020), is surveyed in Belzil
(2007). An alternative approach advocating the use of expectation survey data to estimate behavioral
models has gained substantial popularity in recent years (see Manski, 2004). In the education literature,
Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang (2012), Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2014) and Wiswall and Zafar
(2015) have used subjective expectations in order to study college major choices while Kaufmann (2014),
Delavande and Zafar (2019) and Boneva and Rauh (2019) investigated differences in motives (pecuniary
vs non-pecuniary) for education.
9The determinants and expectations of US high school students is attracting much attention in the
US. For instance, the University of Texas system and the Census Bureau expanded a feature the College
Scorecard website showing the earnings payoffs of 37,459 majors at 4,434 colleges and universities in order
to show how much money graduates earn, broken down by major and campus, in order to help future
students make good choices. As of now, evidence suggests that individuals are not responsive to this sort
of detailed information (Washington Post, December 25, 2020).
10Manski and Molinari (2010) use interval data modeling to characterize the potential consequences
of rounding behavior in survey data. However, their approach does not seem to have been applied in
empirical research. Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2020) elicit mother’s probabilities or age ranges that
children will learn how to do specific developmental tasks and represent those measures with a latent
factor structure and Attanasio, Cunha, and Jervis (2019) study the importance of maternal beliefs.
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Sidibé (2021), who estimated semi-structurally the value of higher education financing
aid from the same financial aid experiment that we use in the current paper. However,
their focus is totally different. The authors are primarily concerned with measuring the
impact of discount factors and risk aversion on financial aid decisions and they ignore most
information contained in the student and parental surveys (they do not use measures of
liquidity constraints, information, and cognitive and non-cognitive abilities). They do not
relate the value of financial aid to structural parameters of the subjective valuation of
higher education and they also ignore information on ex-ante enrollment probabilities.
3 The Field Experiment and Pre-Experiment Sur-
veys
The experiment was funded by the Canada Millennium Foundation (a public enterprise
created by the Canadian federal government) and was carried jointly by The Social Re-
search and Demonstration Corporation (Ottawa) and the Centre Interuniversitaire de
Recherche en Analyse des Organisations (Montreal) between October 2008 and March
2009. The sample, which consists of 1,248 full time Canadian students aged from 16-18
years, was drawn from both urban and rural sites across Canada, although our analysis is
restricted to Ontarian and Manitoban high school students because the school curriculum
is different in Québec (there is an intermediate step between high school and university).11
Our model is estimated from two distinct sources of data. The first element comprises
two surveys: one administered to the students and another one to the parents. Both of
them were administered before the experiment, which is the second source of data. One
positive aspect of the experiment is that those recruited had no knowledge of the choices
to be undertaken subsequently. This implies that answers found in the survey (especially
those pertaining to higher education valuation and intentions) were not contaminated by
potential (expected) changes in higher education costs.
We now describe both the survey and the experiment.
3.1 Student and Parental Surveys
At least one week before the experimental session at school, students were given a unique
identifying number to complete an online survey. At the end of the survey, each student
could select the session to which they were to participate. The aim of the survey questions
was to obtain comprehensive profile of the participants and their family context. Many
survey questions were adapted from some of the most well-known Canadian data sets:
Youth in Transition Survey (YITS), Post Secondary Education Survey (PEPS) and Survey
of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID). They include measures of educational ambitions,
expectations with regards to ambitions, perceived obstacles to pursuing post-secondary
education, financial means at students’ disposal, debt aversion, parents’ education and
parents’ economic status. In addition, several other measurements were included to assess
other attitudes and behaviors like inter-temporal orientation (planning ability), attitudes
towards risk, aspiration level, engagement while in high school, perceptions of labour
market conditions and perceptions of the cost of, and returns to post-secondary education.
11For an in-depth description of the project, see Johnson and Montmarquette (2015).
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Parents were contacted by telephone through a telephone survey company, EKOS.
School sign-up sheets were transmitted to EKOS from the schools. These included student
name and parental phone numbers. They requested consent and conducted a very short
survey. Parents were interviewed by telephone for basic income information, educational
background and expectations concerning their child’s educational achievement. The basic
income and parents’ educational background questions were also asked in the student
survey.
3.1.1 Measurements of Unobserved Factors, Costs and Benefits of Higher
Education and Higher Education Enrollment Intentions
The vast majority of the measurements that we use to identify the relevant factors are
taken from the Student Survey. The questionnaires, along with the financial choice book-
let, may be found in a file containing supplementary material, Section A, in which we
provide a detailed description of each measurement used in order to estimate our model.
Virtually all questions had to be answered within a discrete ordered choice structure such
as : poor, good, very good, excellent, or strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly
agree. All other questions are coded as binary outcomes. We now present a synthetic
summary.
• Primitive factors:
– a cognitive skill factor identified from 8 measures and denoted CO,
– a non-cognitive factor measuring motivation while in high school identified
from 7 measures and denoted MS,
– a non-cognitive factor measuring individual attitudes (the Locus of Control)
identified from 7 measures and denoted LC,
– a factor measuring information about the labor market identified from 5 mea-
sures and denoted MI,
– a factor measuring the extent to which the student feels financially constrained,
identified from 12 measures, and denoted FC.
• Subjective qualitative costs and benefits of higher education:
– the monetary benefits of higher education identified from 4 measures for uni-
versity and 8 measures for post-secondary and denoted MBu and MBps,
– the non-monetary benefits of higher education identified from 8 measures for
university and 16 for post-secondary, and denoted NMBu and NMBps,
– the monetary costs of higher education identified from 4 measures for university
and 8 for post-secondary, and denoted MCu and MCps,
– the non-monetary costs of higher education identified from 7 measures for uni-
versity and 14 measures for post-secondary, and denoted NMCu and NMCps.
10
To ease notation, we use the following notation for each group of factors:
F = {CO,MS,LC,MI, FC}
Xu = {MBu, NMBu,MCu, NMCu}
Xps = {MBps, NMBps,MCps, NMCps}
X = {F,Xu, Xps} .
In total, the primitive factors and the subjective costs and benefits are estimated from
a total of 108 measurements, decomposed into 39 measurements for the primitive factors
and 69 measurements of benefits and costs.
Finally, when estimating the behavioral model, we also make use of information re-
laying intentions to enroll in higher education. Precisely, we use answers to two questions
measuring enrollment intentions:12
• Measure 1: “As things stand now, what is the highest level of education you think
you will get?” The responses can take 3 modalities: university degree, other post-
secondary education, and no further education.
• Measure 2: “What is the highest level of education you would like to get?” The
responses can take 3 modalities: university degree, other post-secondary education,
and no further education.
3.2 Choices between Financial Aid and Cash Payments
The experiment was conducted using pen and paper choice booklets and simple random
sampling devices like bingo balls and dice. Urban and rural school districts were selected
in each of the four provinces and the implementation team was able to carry out work in
urban and rural schools.
All subjects were presented with the full set of decisions and are paid for one, randomly
selected, at the end of the session. The subjects were informed that they would be paid
for one decision, but they did not know which one at the beginning of the session. The
questions can be split into two main groups.
First, young individuals must answer a set of questions aimed at measuring their pref-
erences for risk and time. The design of the questions is based on standard multiple-list
approaches commonly used in experimental economics.13 The second portion, which con-
stitutes the main originality of the experiment, is entirely devoted to individual decisions
between cash payments and higher education financial aid.
The financial aid packages are offered conditional on entering post-secondary education
and comprise various combinations of loans offered at the prevailing market rate of interest
and grants. Financial aid packages offered over the experiment were very generous. They
varied between $500 and $4000 and represented a potentially high fraction of a yearly
tuition at any Canadian university. Over the period considered, a grant of $2,000 in
2008 would have covered 65% of total fees at University of Western Ontario, University
12In the student survey, those questions are D19 and D20.
13Belzil, Maurel, and Sidibé (2021) use the experiment to estimate the value of higher education
financial aid and to measure the relative importance of deep preference parameters (preferences for risk
and time) in explaining the value of higher education.
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of Toronto and Queen’s University. Those universities represent the most prestigious
universities in Ontario.14
In the paper, we make use of 12 choices between a financial aid offer and an immediate
cash payment. Cash payments varied between $25 and $700 although 9 of the 12 choices
that we model incorporated either a $300 or a $700 payment. Before the start of the
decision process, students were presented with the following definitions:
Grant : “Educational grants will be disbursed if a participant enrolls in an institution
for learning or training full time within two years from the date of experiment par-
ticipation. The grant will cover direct and indirect costs related to the learning
activity. For tuition fees, payments will be made directly to the education institu-
tion. Receipts will be required for the reimbursement of other costs.”
Loan: “Educational loans will be disbursed if a participant enrolls in an institution for
learning or training full time. These loans will be available up to two years from the
date of the experiment. The loans are repayable upon the completion of the study
or if the participant drops out of the program of study. The interest rate, which is
the same as the one offered by the Canadian Federal Student Assistance program,
is floating and is set at the prime rate (3.2% on average over the period of interest)
plus 2.5%.”
It is important to note that interest rates attached to loans are also practically iden-
tical to those provided by charter banks within private loans. Indeed, over the period
considered, private loan interest rates were within a 1% range of those offered within the
public system. However, private loans accounted for about 7% of total resources devoted
to higher education financing.15
All 12 decisions are detailed in Table 1. In total, there are 3 different types of offers
considered in our analysis.
• Choices 1 to 5: The first 5 choices are between cash payments and classical loans.
The loans vary between $1000 and $4000 while the cash payments vary between $25
and $700.
• Choices 6 to 12: In the last 7 choices, students must choose between cash payments
and grants equal to $500 (choice 10), $1000 (choices 6, 7, 8 and 9), $2000 (choice
11) and $4000 (choice 12).
The last column of Table 1 documents the fraction of Ontarian and Manitobans high
school students who accepted financial aid for each question (the take-up rates). First,
it should be noted that except for the case where the cash payment is minuscule ($25),
standard loans are chosen by only a minority of students. For grants, we observed the
opposite. Except for choices 9 and 10, where cash payments ($700 and $300) are close
to the amounts of the grants ($1,000 and $500), a majority of young individuals tend to
choose grants.
[Table 1 here]
14The average tuitions was equal to $5667 in Ontario over the period covered by the experiment.
15For more details on higher education financing, see Berger, Motte, and Parkin (2007).
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4 Measuring Primitive Factors and Motives for Higher
Education
In this section, we provide details about the estimation of factors. First, we assume
the existence of individual primitive factors which include cognitive ability, motivation
in school, the locus of control, one factor measuring knowledge about the labor market
and the financial aid system, and last one measuring liquidity constraints perceptions.
These 5 individual factors are then mapped onto four major components that summarize
individual perceptions about the likelihood to attend higher education in the future.
Those components, which are monetary benefits, non-monetary benefits, monetary costs
and non-monetary costs, represent different motives for attending higher education.
4.1 Student Skills, Liquidity Constraint Perceptions and Mar-
ket Information
The vector of primitive factors is denoted Fi and incorporates COi, MSi, LCi, MIi and
FCi. Those factors are meant to represent individual skills, information and liquidity
constraints perceptions. To ease notation, we use fi as a generic term denoting any single
factor belonging to Fi.
For each of the f ′s, we observe a specific set of dedicated measurements taken from the
student survey and the parental survey. The jth measurement (for individual i) devoted
to factor f is denoted M fji . The probability that the measure M
fj
i takes the modality
mfji depends on the nature of the recording (continuous or discrete). We now detail the
contribution to the likelihood for each specific type of recording.
4.1.1 Case 1: Discrete Measurements
For discrete (binary) measurements, we assume the existence of a latent variable, M̃ fj,
such that




1 · fi + ζ
fj
i ,
where the ζfj′i s represent measurement error shocks and are assumed to follow a Normal
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Measurement errors are independent
across individuals and measures and mfj0 and m
fj
1 are parameters to be estimated. Their
identification is addressed below.
The contribution to the likelihood of measurement M fji (conditional on the factor) is
Pr(M fji = m
fj











where Φ(·) is the standard Normal cumulative distribution function. When measurements
take more than 2 values, we treat them as continuous measurements.
4.1.2 Case 2: Continuous Measurements
Some of the measurements used in our analysis (for instance, the Numeracy Test score) are
recorded as continuous variables. To avoid an unreasonable number of parameters, we also










where mfj0 and m
fj
1 are parameters to be estimated and ζ
fj
i is the measurement error term
which is assumed Normal with mean 0 and standard deviation σfj. The contribution to
the likelihood is simply















where φ(·) denotes the standard Normal density.
4.2 Subjective Monetary and Non-monetary Benefits and Costs
of Higher Education
Cognitive and non-cognitive skills, as well as information about the labor market are
mapped onto individual beliefs about both monetary and non-monetary benefits (denoted
MBe and NMBe respectively) and monetary and non-monetary costs (denoted MCe and





CO · COi + δ
MB,e
MS ·MSi + δ
MB,e
LC · LCi +
δMB,eMI ·MIi + ξ
MB,e





CO · COi + δ
NMB,e
MS ·MSi + δ
NMB,e
LC · LCi +
δNMB,eMI ·MIi + ξ
NMB,e





CO · COi + δ
MC,e
MS ·MSi + δ
MC,e
LC · LCi +
δMC,eMI ·MIi + ξ
MC,e





CO · COi + δ
NMC,e
MS ·MSi + δ
NMC,e
LC · LCi +
δNMC,eMI ·MIi + ξ
NMC,e
i for e = u, ps ,
where δMB,e0 , δ
MB,e
CO , . . . , δ
NMC,e
MI are parameters measuring the effect of individual primitive







individual specific components of non-benefits and costs which may not be accounted for
by primitive factors. This means that all four components of the intertemporal utility of
attending school are arbitrarily correlated with each other through the recursive effects
of the primitive factors. We exclude the financial constraint factor (FC) from the costs
and benefits because it plays a direct role in the model as indicated below.
The measurements for subjective benefits and costs are denoted mMB,e,j, mNMB,e,j,
mMC,e,j and mNMC,e,j and are all discrete ordered. As for the primitive factors, they are



























1 ·NMCei + ζ
NMC,e,j
i ,







and ζNMC,e,ji are measurement error shocks which follow a Normal distribution with mean
0 and standard deviation equal to σMB,e,j, σNMB,e,j, σMC,e,j and σNMC,e,j respectively.
More details regarding estimation are found below in conjunction with the estimation
of the model in the next section. Empirical estimates will also be discussed in the next
section but many results will be found in a supplementary file to ease presentation.
5 Modeling the Ex-Ante Value of Higher Education
and Financial Aid from Survey Data
5.1 The Model
To fulfill our objectives, we need a model of higher education attendance under the status-
quo (outside the experiment) which is meant to reflect individual intentions revealed
in the survey. We refer to period 0 as the interval (about 6-month) between the time
when individuals participate into both the survey and the experiment and the time when
they would actually decide to enter higher education and assume that actual enrollment
decisions would take place at the beginning of period 1. All periods subsequent to period
0 actually last one year. We set a terminal date at period 20 (corresponding to age 38 to
40 for most individuals).
It is understood that entering university (superscript u), entering other post-secondary
institution (superscript ps) or taking the outside option (superscript a) can only happen
in period 1 and for this reason, there is no need for time subscripts for the terms defining
the following intertemporal utilities:
• V̄ ui,sq: expected lifetime utility of student i entering university in period 1 under the
status-quo (subscript sq), using information available at the beginning of period 0
(survey time).
• V̄ psi,sq: expected lifetime utility of student i entering other type of post-secondary
institution in period 1 under the status-quo, using information available at the
beginning of period 0 (survey time).
• V̄ ai,sq: expected lifetime utility of student i of choosing the alternative option (not
to enter university) in period 1 under the status-quo using information available in
period 0.
5.1.1 The Alternative Option
As neither the experiment nor the surveys provide data on life-cycle consumption, we
set the consumption level of the alternative option (to leave education after high school
completion) to an estimate of the average yearly net income of high school or post-high
school certificate obtained from an official publication of the Analytical Studies Branch
Research of Statistics Canada (Frenette, 2014). This leads us to a yearly consumption
reference level set to $34,000. The expected lifetime utility of the alternative option, V̄ ai,sq,
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is therefore interpreted as the discounted sum of an average flat consumption profile over
that period. It is equal to




βt−1 · (log c̃i + εait)
}
where εait is an i.i.d. mean 0 disturbance term affecting the valuation of the alternative
option (realized at survey time) and β = 1
1+0.05
.
5.1.2 The Value of Higher Education
For the expected lifetime utility of going to university, V̄ ui,sq, we split the forthcoming
periods into two parts: one college episode lasting 4 years and a post-education episode
made of 16 years of employment. For other post-secondary studies, V̄ psi,sq, we assume 2
years of education (as is the case for most community college programs) and 18 years of
labor market employment.
As we neither observe the consumption level achieved in school nor in the labor market,
our estimate is a generic term that may incorporate individual beliefs about financial and
non-financial rewards net of borrowing plans that are not revealed in the survey. For
this reason, we cannot measure subjective returns to education as defined in standard
Mincerian or Beckerian models.
If we could access data on pecuniary and non-pecuniary net benefits of education
only, differentiating between consumption while in school and post-education consumption
would be tenuous. However, as we are able to dissociate monetary costs and non-monetary
costs from both monetary and non-monetary benefits, we can use this information (along
with other restrictions) to separate post-education consumption from consumption while
in school.
In order to reduce the burden of notation, we rely again on the generic superscript
e which applies to university (u) and post-secondary education (ps), and present one
set of equation only when possible. From now on, we use small letters to represent
structural parameters representing benefits and costs in monetary units (or utility) in
order to distinguish them from the qualitative costs and benefit factors identified from
survey data (in Section 4). The structural components are therefore denoted mcu, nmcu,
mbu and nmbu for university education and mcps, nmcps, mbps and nmbps for other types
of post-secondary education.
To facilitate comprehension, it is convenient to distinguish between the levels of con-
sumption that would prevail under the status-quo (characterizing beliefs when the survey
takes place in period 0), which we denote by cei,sq and c
m,e
i,sq , from the level of consumption
that would be affected by acceptance of counterfactual financial aid offers such as those
involved in the experiment. The latter will be introduced in the next section. The term
cei,sq refers to consumption while in education of type e while c
m,e
i,sq refers to post-education
consumption generated by education of type e when in the labor market (superscript m).
The per-period utility flow of attending higher education depends on a consumption
profile and a disutility level (driven by non-monetary costs). The utility flow when working
in the labor market depends on the consumption level and non-monetary benefits (nmbei ).
By allowing cei,sq to be inferior to c
me
i,sq, we therefore assume that the student cannot smooth
consumption fully over periods of education and schooling.
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One element of the utility of attending higher education which is not accounted for
in the student survey is the non-monetary benefit of attending education as all questions
related to non-monetary benefits are referring to amenities perceived while in the labor
market.16 For this reason, we need to introduce a supplementary element, denoted cvei ,
and which corresponds to the consumption value of attending higher education.
The per-period utility of attending education of type e under the status quo, denoted
U eit(·), and the period utility of working after graduation, denoted Umeit (·) are then equal
to
U eit(·) = ln(cei,sq)− nmcei + cvei + εeit
Umeit (·) = ln(cmei,sq) + nmbei + εmeit ,
where εeit and ε
me
it are i.i.d. random shocks (with mean 0) and where the subjective con-




with c̃ei representing a reference consumption level to be detailed below.




where mbmei measures the monetary equivalent of self-reported financial benefits of higher
education (measured in deviation from the alternative consumption level c̃).
To estimate the model, we need to choose a functional form for the mapping from
subjective benefit and cost factors (in capital letters), which are purely qualitative and
have no monetary scale, onto relevant structural components of the ex-ante utility of
higher education. The parameterization chosen is discussed below, along with identifi-
cation issues. At this stage, it is sufficient to regard structural parameters as depending
deterministically on the distribution of all factors.
Putting all these elements together, the expected lifetime utility of going to university,
V̄ ui,sq, and its pendant for the post-secondary option , V̄
ps




βt−1 · (ln{c̃ui −mcui } − nmcui + cvui ) +
20∑
t=5






βt−1 · (ln{c̃psi −mc
ps







βt−1 · (ln{c̃+mbm,psi }+ nmb
m,ps
i ) .
We interpret the utility functions as reduced-form representations of more structural
objects which may incorporate savings decisions or any other choices exerted in the future.
16In the structural literature, this form of non-monetary benefit is referred to as the consumption value
(Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Gong et al., 2019).
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In order to estimate the model and obtain identification, we need to impose restrictions
on some key parameters. Those are discussed in the next section.
In the survey, individuals must state their intention about higher education attendance
in period 0. To interpret those intentions and avoid degenerate probabilities, we need to
treat them as random variables. We assume that the relevant valuations, denoted V ui (0),
V psi (0) and V
a
i (0), are equal to the sum of their expected lifetime utility plus a random
disturbance realized in period 0. We thereby obtain the following equations:



















i0 are random shocks affecting the valuation of entering higher edu-
cation in the future (when reaching period 1) but realized in period 0. When assumed to
follow an Extreme Value distributions, those shocks generate standard logistic probabili-
ties.
5.2 Identification and Estimation
To estimate the model, various restrictions (or normalizations) need to be imposed. One
set relates to the measurement of individual factors. A second one relates to the identifi-
cation of individual beliefs about consumption and utility levels reached while in higher
education and once in the market.
5.2.1 The Distribution of Primitive Factors, Benefits and Costs
A first set of restrictions concerns the intercept terms and the loading coefficients of some
of the measurement equations. A second set incorporates exclusion restrictions within
the measurement system. We assume that each primitive factor has its own dedicated
measurements. This means that a total of 39 measurements are used to infer 5 primitive
factors. The dedication of specific measurements allow us to use the correlation between
measures to infer the correlation between factors, and thereby allows us to avoid assuming
orthogonality.
To be more precise, we choose one question for each set of measurement and set its
loading parameter to 1 and its intercept to 0. Details are provided in Section B of the
supplementary file.
When estimating the distribution of factors, we use a discrete approximation of the
joint distribution of the primitive factors. We approximate the joint distribution of the
5 primitive factors by a multi-variate discrete distribution. In line with Bajari, Fox, and
Ryan (2007) and Train (2008), we adopt a fixed (and known) mass points approach by
choosing grid points covering the entire range of possible values and estimate all associated
frequencies (type probabilities).17 First, we normalize the measurements so to help us set
17While most recent papers using factor structures assume that the factors are continuous random
variables, their empirical implementation require to use approximation methods which translate invariably
into a form of discretization. For instance, Heckman, Humphries, and Veramendi (2018), Humphries,
Joensen, and Veramendi (2019) and Ashworth et al. (2020) all use polynomial approximation methods
in conjunction with Normality of the factors.
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up support points for the distribution of each factor. We then assume that each factor can
take one of the following values, -1.5, -0.5, 0.0, 0.5 and 1.5, except the market information
factor which takes values, -1.0, 0, 0.5, 1 and 2. This generates 55 = 3125 different
combinations.
Obtaining identification of the qualitative monetary and non-monetary benefits and
costs is relatively straightforward, given identification of the primitive factors. To do so,
we make use of 69 measurements on monetary and non-monetary components (costs and
benefits) of the ex-ante returns to university and other post-secondary education. All of
them depend on 4 primitive factors (cognitive ability, motivation in school, locus of control
and market information). The 5th factor, namely the financial constraint indicator, is used
as a determinant of monetary consumption cei,sq.
When estimating the distribution of benefits and costs, we fix the intercept terms (δ0’s)
to 0 and estimate the ξi’s for each type.
18 This means that each marginal distribution of
costs and benefits has 3125 points.
5.2.2 Ex-ante Beliefs
In order to translate individual perceptions about benefits and costs into estimable compo-
nents of the ex-ante utility of attending higher education, we need to impose restrictions
on the mappings between qualitative factors (costs and benefits) and their monetary
equivalents. To obtain a mapping from the factors on structural parameters, we express
the structural parameters as a function of the rank of its corresponding factor.





1 ·Rank(MCei ) +mce2 ·Rank2(MCei ) + . . .+





1 ·Rank(NMCei ) + nmce2 ·Rank2(NMCei ) + . . .+





1 ·Rank(MBei ) +mbe2 ·Rank2(MBei ) + . . .+





1 ·Rank(NMBei ) + nmbe2 ·Rank2(NMBei ) + . . .+
nmbe5 ·Rank5(NMBei ) for e = u, ps .
We proceed similarly with the individual consumption while in school (c̃ei ) and the
consumption value (cvei ). We assume that c̃
e
i depend on the financial constraint factor and
the market information factor (MIi and FCi) and that the consumption value depends on
cognitive and non-cognitive factors (CO, MS and LC). In both cases, we use polynomials
of order 2 as each of the primitive factor has 5 points of support only and the ranks can
only take 5 values. To limit space, we do not reproduce their equations here.
18Williams (2020) discusses identification of the classical linear factor model. He shows that a variety
of models used in micro-econometrics tend to impose more restrictions than actually needed in order
to identify their model. To provide an intuitive reasoning to identification, one has to note that, even
ignoring higher order moments, the availability of 108 measurements implies nearly 6000 first and second
order moments (means, variances and covariances).
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As both consumption while in school (cui,sq and c
ps
i,sq) and post-higher education con-
sumption (cmui,sq and c
mps
i,sq ) are identified from self-reported intentions of attending higher
education, it is clear that there must be an infinite number of combinations that can
rationalize observed choices.
In practice, this means that the intercept terms of the expression relating individual
consumption while in school (c̃ei ) and the consumption value (cv
e
i ) to the ranks of the
primitive factors cannot be distinguish from the location parameters of the monetary and
non-monetary costs and the consumption value (cve0) and therefore renders the separa-
tion of consumption while in school and post-schooling consumption impossible without
restrictions.
To obtain identification, we set the minimal consumption level to be the poverty level,
as defined by Canadian authorities and associate it to types that are endowed to the
minimum of the information factor and the maximum for both the financial constraint
and the monetary cost factors.19
Altogether, these restrictions allows us to achieve the following. First, we can sepa-
rate the monetary components of consumption while in school from the non-pecuniary
dimensions of the utility of attending education, although we cannot separate the loca-
tion parameters of the consumption value from that of the non-monetary costs. However,
as will become clear when discussing empirical results, identification of the scale of each
structural component will allow us to quantify the relative importance of each factor.
Second, with respect to post-education benefits, knowledge of the minimum level of
consumption achievable (equal to that of the outside option) along with the normalization
of mbe0 to 0, allows us to estimate the location parameter of the non-monetary benefits of
education and therefore separate the per-period utility of attending education from the
utility of post-education labor market experience.20 As was the case with consumption
while in school, the relative importance of monetary and non-monetary benefits may be
evaluated using the scale of each component.
5.2.3 Likelihood and Estimation Method
As indicated earlier, we separate the estimation of the model from the estimation of the
distribution of the primitive factors and benefits and costs of education. We do so because
one of our objectives is to evaluate the explanatory power of the subjective valuations of
the related benefits and costs of education. We now present each component. To ease
notation, we represent all of them after conditioning on relevant factors, namely Fi and
all ξi’s.
The first component is the contribution to the likelihood of primitive factor measure-






i | Fi) .
19According to living standards found in documentation titled “Low Income Lines, 2008-2009” from
the Income Statistics Division of Statistics Canada, a person living with about $8,000 would be judged
as at the poverty level.
20The reader will note that an alternative approach would have been to normalize the location pa-
rameter of the non-monetary benefits and estimate mbe0 freely. We chose to estimate the non-monetary
benefits (and normalize mbe0) mostly because official statistics provide more guidance about the minimum
consumption level than about the minimum level of non-monetary benefits induced by education.
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The contribution to the likelihood of benefits and costs measurements (denoted LBC,ui























Pr(MMB,e,1 = mMB,e,1 | Fi, ξMB,ei ) · . . . · Pr(MMB,e,4 = mMB,e,4 | Fi, ξ
MB,e
i ) ·
Pr(MNMB,e,1 = mNMB,e,1 | Fi, ξNMB,ei ) · . . . · Pr(MNMB,e,8 = mNMB,e,8 | Fi, ξNMB,e) ·
Pr(MMC,e,1 = mMC,e,1 | Fi, ξMC,ei ) · . . . · Pr(MMC,e,4 = mMC,e,4 | Fi, ξ
MC,e
i ) ·
Pr(MNMC,e,1 = mNMC,e,1 | Fi, ξNMC,ei ) · . . . · Pr(MNMC,e,7 = mNMC,e,7 | Fi, ξ
NMC,e
i ) ,
for e = u and e = ps and 69 measurements for each individual. Those are used to form a









To introduce the contribution to the likelihood of higher education enrollment beliefs
(under the status-quo), we need to define indicators obtained from the enrollment inten-
tions described in Section 3.1.1. For each measure, we obtain binary indicators U1i (for
university), PS1i (for post-secondary), A1i (for no higher education) from the first mea-
sure and U2i, PS2i, A2i (defined similarly) from the second measure. The contribution to
the likelihood, denoted Ledui , is given by
Ledui (·) = Λu∗i,w(.;Fi, ξi)U1i · Λ
ps∗
i,w (.;Fi, ξi))
PS1i · Λa∗i,w(.;Fi, ξi))A1i ·
Λu∗i,w(.;Fi, ξi)
























The total likelihood, for a given individual i, and denoted Li, is constructed by taking




pm · LFi (Fim) · LBCi (Fm, ξm) · Ledui (.;Fm, ξm) .
In total, the likelihood is composed of 77,550 contributions (705 individuals times 110
measurements and choices).
Estimation Method To estimate the model, we proceed in 3 steps. They are defined
as follows.
Step 1
We estimate the probabilities of all possible combinations of the primitive factors
where each pm are estimated as a Logistic transform. From the first stage likelihood,
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we obtain an estimate of the type probabilities, p̂m, by maximizing the likelihood∑3125
m=1 pm ·LFi (Fm) where the Fm’s are composed of the grid points mentioned earlier.
There are 3125 of them.21
Step 2
With the joint distribution of primitive factors in hand, we then construct the con-
ditional distribution of the costs and benefits factors introduced in sub-section 4.2.
In the second step, we maximize the likelihood given by the following expression
M∑
m=1
p̂m · L̂Fi (Fm) · LBCi (Fm, ξMBm , ξNMBm , ξMCm , ξNMCm ) ,
where M denotes the number of elements in the support of the primitive factors
which have density above the threshold and obtain ξ̂m = {ξ̂MBm , ξ̂NMBm , ξ̂MCm , ξ̂NMCm }.
Step 3
Finally, with the distribution of costs, benefits, and primitive factors, we estimate
the structural parameters of the ex-ante utility of attending higher education using




p̂m · L̂Fi (Fm) · L̂BCi (Fm, ξ̂m ) · Ledui ( .;Fm, ξ̂m)
and obtain estimates that allow us to reconstruct the population distribution of all
structural parameters determining schooling intentions under the status-quo. We estimate
the parameters of the model by maximizing the logarithm of the product of all individual
contributions. Estimation is performed using Fortran IMSL routines.22
5.3 Estimates of the Ex-ante Value of Higher Education from
Survey Data
Before discussing estimates of the behavioral model, we summarize the distribution of the
unobserved primitive and costs and benefits factors.
5.3.1 The Distribution of Factors, Costs and Benefits
To limit the length of the paper, we only summarize some key findings and present a more
detailed discussion in Section B of the supplementary file.
Not surprisingly, we find that the cognitive skill factor (CO) is positively correlated
with motivation in school (MS) and with the locus of control (LC). The financial con-
straint factor (FC) tends to be relatively weakly correlated with other factors. The market
21In practice, many of these combinations are close to 0, so when maximizing the likelihood, we only
retain those types with population proportion exceeding 0.0001.
22While splitting estimation into 3 steps allows us to obtain consistent estimates of all parameters,
it does not provide consistent estimates of the standard errors. To obtain those, one method would be
to use the full information likelihood function so to capture the effect of the first stage parameters and
compute the resulting variance-covariance matrix using the Hessian (Arcidiacono, 2005). However, the
total number of parameters needed over the 3 steps renders this approach hardly feasible.
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information factor (MI) factor is positively correlated with both the cognitive factor and
the motivation factor indicating that those more likely to attend higher education tend
to be more informed about financial aid opportunities.
As normally expected, benefits and costs are negatively correlated. This is the case
for both university and post-secondary education. At the same time, those endowed with
high monetary benefit expectations also tend to be endowed with high non-monetary
benefit expectations.
We find that the primitive factors explain at most 50% of the total variation across
types for each benefit or cost factor. In some cases such as university and post-secondary
monetary benefits, the primitive factors account for at most 25%. In many others, they
account for one third only.23 This validates our approach which consisted in allowing each
cost and benefit factor to be explained by its own unobserved heterogeneity.
5.3.2 Structural Estimates
With the distribution of benefits and costs in hand, it is now possible to obtain the struc-
tural parameters governing higher education decisions by maximizing the total likelihood
of reported attendance intentions. As the parameters mapping ranks onto utilities are
not directly interpretable, they are presented in a supplementary file. It is however more
informative to examine the relationship between the ranks of the costs and benefit factors
and the relevant per-period utilities (Figure 1).
[Figure 1 here]
In general, the functions mapping factor ranks onto utilities reproduced in Figure 1
reveal non-trivial relationships. While self-reported monetary and non-monetary costs of
university appear to have a monotonically decreasing impact on utility, this is far from
being the case for all other components. The effect of the university monetary benefit
factor appears to be particularly flat while the non-monetary benefit factor discloses a
weakly increasing effect in the initial phase but reaches a flat spot at higher ranks.
The presence of non-monotonicities appear to be particularly problematic with post-
secondary monetary and non-monetary costs. In both cases, and at least in the initial
ranges, higher costs imply higher per-period utilities. On a more positive side, both post-
secondary monetary and non-monetary benefits seem to have a monotonically increasing
effect on per-period utility. However, the relationship seems weak thereby indicating that
post-secondary education subjective benefits may not be informative.
[Table 2 here]
As indicated in Table 2, our model predicts stated education intentions quite well as it
predicts that 66% will attend university, 31% will attend other post-secondary institutions
and only 3% would not go beyond high school. These are very close to the average
frequencies observed for the first measure (question D19), which are equal to 64%, 32%
and 4% respectively.
23In a supplementary file, we also report the structural parameters of the function mapping factors
onto benefits and costs. Overall, the results are coherent with pure intuition. For instance, cognitive
skills and motivation in school are found to have a positive impact on both monetary and non-monetary
benefits and a negative effect on non-monetary costs.
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The average lifetime utilities obtained for the 3 options (50.6 for university, 48.8 for
other post-secondary) are also reported in Table 2. There is a substantial amount of
heterogeneity as indicated by the high enrollment probability inter-quartile ranges, equal
to 0.59 (0.98− 0.39) for university and 0.51 (0.53− 0.02) for other post-secondary.
To ease comprehension and first obtain a crude comparison with respect to the out-
side option, it is useful to translate the intertemporal utilities into a monetary indicator
and evaluate the flat consumption profile that would provide the level of intertemporal
utilities of the two education options (university and other post-secondary institution)
since the alternative option is itself defined as a flat consumption profile of $34,000 per
year. Those are reported in Table 2 as well. They indicate that for the average individual
in the population, choosing university provides a welfare level that is equivalent to a flat
consumption profile equal to $63,500 per year (for 20 years) while choosing other post-
secondary is equivalent to a total yearly consumption of $53,173. These numbers obviously
reflect the totality of financial and non-monetary rewards and ignore the split between
education years and post-education years, but they also illustrate the important role of
heterogeneity as the inter-quartile differentials are close to $30,000 ($74, 651 − $45, 121)
for university and $20,000 ($61, 002− $43, 152) for post-secondary.
To separate consumption from non-monetary utilities and to distinguish between util-
ity flow during and after education, it is interesting to gauge the importance of the 4 main
monetary components. Three of them, namely monetary costs, market information and
financial constraint perceptions, affect expected consumption while in school while the 4th
one, monetary benefits, affects expected post-education consumption. As stated earlier,
it is not possible to separate the location parameters of the monetary and non-monetary
components, but as their scale depend directly on individual factors, it is still possible to
assess their relative importance.
To evaluate it, we computed the impact of shutting down those specific factors on
lifetime consumption. The contribution of each model component is calculated using the
difference between the estimated type-specific consumption level and the consumption
level obtained when all types are set at the minimum level.
[Table 3 here]
The results, found in Table 3, indicate that individual differences in liquidity con-
straints and differences in monetary costs perceptions are a more important determinant
of the decision to attend other post-secondary institutions than university. Precisely,
eliminating monetary costs would raise consumption by $15,603 while attending univer-
sity and by $20,299 for other post- secondary. Differences in financial constraint percep-
tions appear to have a small impact on consumption in university ($6770) but a large
one on consumption while attending post-secondary ($18,910). Interestingly, the factor
measuring individual differences in information has its largest effect on post-secondary
attendance as eliminating information would reduce consumption by $34,841. This may
indicate that those who report being well-informed are also those enjoying a higher con-
sumption level either because they are receiving larger transfers from their parents or
because they expect more financial aid.
As will become clear below, non-monetary benefits are a much more important deter-
minant of revealed higher education intentions than monetary benefits for either university
or post-secondary. However, we find monetary benefits to be a much more important de-
terminant of post-secondary institution attendance than university. Putting every type
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of individuals at the lowest level, would reduce post-education consumption by $121,257
over the early life-cycle when considering post-secondary, as opposed to $33,557 for uni-
versity. This indicates that young individuals have much more dispersed beliefs about the
financial rewards of post-secondary education compared to their beliefs about university
education.
[Table 4 here]
We now turn to the quantification of the overall differences between monetary and
non-monetary components, and put them in perspective. By shutting down each possible
component (both monetary and non-monetary), we can evaluate the extent to which
individual intentions are explained primarily by non-monetary dimensions. In Table 4,
we report the % changes in lifetime utility attributable to each dimension, and also their
impact on expected enrollment probabilities.
The results show ample evidence that the intention to enroll in university is motivated
by non-pecuniary elements. Non-monetary benefits are by far the most important as
shutting down their effects would reduce lifetime utility by 6.2% and reduce enrollment
proportion by 0.34. Non-monetary costs appear to be the second most important element,
as it would reduce life-cycle well being by 3.6% and reduce enrollment probability by
0.21. The factors measuring cognitive ability and motivation in school, which presumably
approximate the consumption value of education, are the 3rd and 4th most important
determinants. Putting everyone at the lowest level of the liquidity constraint factor would
raise the lifetime utility of attending university by less than 1% and affect enrollment only
marginally.
The results are somewhat similar for other post-secondary institutions. Again, non-
monetary benefit is the most important determinant with welfare effects equal to -6.5%
and an enrollment impact equal to -0.27, although monetary benefits is the second deter-
minant with a 3.8% loss when removing it and an effect of 0.20 on enrollment probability.
As for university enrollment, non-monetary costs are an important determinant, as elim-
inating them would raise welfare by 3.7% and raise enrollment probability by 0.18. As
was the case with university, both financial constraint perceptions and information are
relatively unimportant.
To summarize, beliefs and intentions disclosed by the students participating in the
survey imply a very high valuation of higher education (especially university), very high
hypothetical attendance probabilities, and a particularly important role played by non-
financial dimensions.
5.3.3 Robustness and Reduced-Form Estimates
In order to assess the robustness of the results obtained from the structural model, we
also evaluated the impact of all factors, using the reduced-form representation of the
ex-ante attendance probabilities from survey data. We therefore use a reduced-form rep-
resentations of the intertemporal utilities of attending university and other post-secondary
institutions (V̄ ui,sq and V̄
ps
i,sq) in reference to V̄
a
i,sq by maximum likelihood assuming Extreme-
Value random shocks. As we did when estimating the structural model on the survey, we
set V̄ ai,sq to
∑20
t=1 β
t−1 · log(c̃) where c̃ = $34, 000. We specify V̄ ui,sq and V̄
ps




i (defined in Section 3.1)








and therefore ignore the distinction between consumption while in school and post-
education consumption. In Table 5, we report the marginal effects obtained for a one-
standard deviation change in each determinant.
[Table 5 here]
Overall, the results are consistent with those obtained when estimating the structural
model. First, the probability of attending university decreases with its own costs and
increases with its own benefits. This is also the case with post-secondary education.
Second, as was noted when estimating the structural model, individual choices appear
to be based primarily on non-monetary components as opposed to monetary benefits and
costs. The effect of a one-standard deviation increase in university non-monetary benefits
on university attendance (equal to 0.11) is twice as large as the effect of a similar increase
on monetary benefits (0.05). The effect of non-monetary costs (-0.09) is about 5 times
larger than the effect of monetary costs (-0.02). The results are practically identical for
the demand for post-secondary institution, as the impact of non-monetary benefits are 2
times as large as the impact of monetary benefits and the non-monetary costs effects are
4 times as important as monetary costs.
Finally, among individual factors, the cognitive skill factor is by far the most important
as it raises university attendance by 0.09 and reduces post-secondary attendance by 0.07.
It is interesting to note that the financial constraint factor has no significant impact
on either university or other post-secondary attendance. The estimates indicate that it
reduces university attendance probability by 0.01 but its effect is insignificant and that
the impact on post-secondary attendance (0.003) is very small. The factor measuring
information seems to have no impact whatsoever.
As both structural and reduced-form estimates point toward the domination of non-
financial components of higher education intentions, it will now be interesting to evaluate
their implications for the valuation of counterfactual financial aid policies.
5.3.4 Implications for Financial Aid
Returning to the main objective of the paper, which is to obtain two separate distributions
of the welfare gains of financial aid offers in the experiment, we now use the structural
parameters obtained from survey data to predict the welfare gain of the specific offers
found in the experiment (found in Table 1). Any offer q may be represented by a vector
Aq = {Gq, Lq} where G denotes a grant and L a loan, and where either G or L must be
equal to 0 and let’s introduce an indicator, diq, equal to 1 when financial aid offer q is
accepted and 0 if not.
To obtain the distribution of the marginal utilities of financial aid from the surveys, we
increase the consumption while in school under the status quo by the amount of financial
aid accepted and the level prevailing after conditioning on financial aid offer acceptance
and now write the new consumption level, ceiq(·), as a function of financial aid decisions
about offer q:




q (diq, Aq) for e = u, ps,
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where ce,faq (·) is a function that maps financial aid offers and period 0 decisions onto con-
sumption during university. Note that ce,faq (·) is allowed to depend on the “e” superscript
only because we assume that the agent divides the amount of financial aid equally across
years required by a standard curriculum which is not the same at a university than at
2-year colleges. It also depends on q as each offer is potentially different. They are given
by the following equations:
cu,faq (·) = (0.25 ·Gq + 0.25 · Lq) · diq
cps,faq (·) = (0.50 ·Gq + 0.50 · Lq) · diq .
Second, we must model the effect of loan expected repayment on post-university con-
sumption. Denoting post-university consumption by cm,eiq (·), we define it as follows
cm,eiq (diq, Aq) = c
m,e
i,sq − cm,faq (diq, Aq) ,
where cm,faq (·) denotes the yearly repayment that is induced by accepting a loan. We
assume that individuals anticipate repayment over 10 years (maximum under Canadian
regulations) and start repaying 1 year after college completion. Because repayment only
applies for loans (that is when Lq > 0), it follows that
cm,faq (diq, Aq) = L
r
q · diq
where Lrq denotes the yearly repayment associated to Lq. We define it as




(1 + r)10 − 1
)
,
where r is the interest rate.
Finally, after replacing the status-quo consumption levels estimated in the survey
(cei,sq and c
m,e
i,sq) by their values reflecting the impact of accepting financial aid (c
e
iq(·) and
cm,eiq (·)), it is then easy to evaluate the marginal lifetime utilities of accepting any grant or
loan, including all those that are offered in the experiment. These counterfactual marginal
lifetime utilities will then be confronted to those estimated in the experiment in Section 7.
Before doing so, and in order to illustrate the main features of the model estimated
from the survey, we first use the structural parameters obtained from survey data to pre-
dict the welfare gain of providing generous higher education financial aid and its related
impact on counterfactual higher education attendance probabilities. To do so, we simu-
late the implementation of a generous $16,000 grant ($4,000 for each year of university)
which would make practically university education free.24 We proceed similarly for post-
secondary education. Finally, we examine the impact of an annual $4,000 subsidy for
either type of education. The results are in Panel A of Table 6.
[Table 6 Panel A here]
The results provide some clear evidence on the behavioral implications of individual
beliefs and intentions. Put generally, those imply that generous higher education financial
aid would be welfare improving but would have little impact on total higher education
enrollments.
24The impact of loan provisions will be analyzed in the context of the field experiment.
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First, when considered separately, providing free post-secondary education and free
university would increase ex-ante welfare by 0.13% (for post-secondary) and 1.12% for
university. Providing free post-secondary education would raise post-secondary enroll-
ments by 0.023, but this increase would be at the expense of university enrollments which
would drop by 0.020. Providing free university would raise university enrollments by 0.098
but would reduce post-secondary enrollments by 0.089. In the case where both types of
higher education would be subsidized, the increase in university enrollments would be
slightly lower than when only university is subsidized (0.080) but the decrease in other
post-secondary institution enrollments would also be more important (0.070). So, despite
the welfare gains, the total of post-secondary and university enrollments would raise by
0.010.
[Table 6 Panel B here]
In Panel B of Table 6, we report the welfare gains induced by a $2,000 grant and a
$2,000 loan, as these are representative of many financial aid package offered in the field
experiment. Note that these offers are fully portable in any post-secondary institutions.
In line with was noted already when commenting on Panel A, the welfare gain of a $2,000
student loan would represent less than a one tenth of 1% increase in lifecycle utility and
would correspond to the difference between the modest gain in utility attributed to early
consumption and the small loss caused by subsequent repayment.
The findings reported in both panels of Table 6 are easily explained. While individual
consumption while in school matters, it seems that enrollment expectations are already
very high under the status quo. As noted earlier, enrollments are primarily driven by
non-financial parameters. This indicates that providing generous grants (reducing the
cost of higher education) or generous loans remains ineffective at raising enrollments but
raises welfare mostly by raising consumption during education.
6 Modeling Decisions in the Experiment
6.1 The Model
As choices exerted in the field experiment disclose information about the marginal utility
of financial aid only, it is not possible to identify the same structural parameters estimated
from the survey such as the expected value of following the optimal strategy (either
university, post-secondary or alternative option) given rejection of financial aid (under
the status-quo). This is however not needed as we can already obtain the distribution of
the marginal utility of financial aid from the survey.
Recalling that in the experiment, individuals exert q binary decisions between im-
mediate cash payments (in period 0) and financial aid, it follows that recovering the in-
tertemporal marginal utilities of financial aid requires to identify the difference in period
0 utilities induced by the acceptance or the rejection of the cash payment.
One limitation of the experiment is that individuals disclose their preference between
accepting cash or taking up financial aid but it is impossible to know if individuals who
accept the cash payment also save a portion for the period when they decide to enter higher
education or not. While saving behavior is unlikely to be relevant when cash payments are
relatively modest, it may be more likely when individuals face decisions between financial
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aid and cash offers of $700. As estimating a saving rate would be tenuous, we ignore
saving and instead we estimate the model presented below on all decisions, and then re-
estimate it after excluding decisions in which the cash payment is equal to $700. If a large
share of the experiment’s subjects choose cash in order to save, this would automatically
tend to reduce the valuation of financial aid and affect our results. We shall return to
this point when discussing empirical estimates.
To retain symmetry with the model estimated from survey data, we assume a log-
arithmic utility function. We interpret choices as involving a comparison between two
intertemporal utilities. Dropping the individual subscript for convenience, the value of
accepting the cash payment at decision q, denoted Cq, is equal to
V (accept Cq) = ln(cr + Cq) + β1Emax(V
u, V ps, V a | status-quo) ,
where cr is a reference consumption level that would prevail if the cash payment is rejected
and β1Emax(V
u, V ps, V a | status-quo) is the intertemporal utility achievable beyond high
school graduation in absence of any additional financial aid opportunities. The discount
factor, denoted β1, is equal to
1
1+0.05·∆ti , where ∆ti is the fraction of the year that separates
the experiment date to September 1st, 2009. Note that Emax(V u, V ps, V a | status-quo)
is identified from the survey as well.
The value of accepting financial aid Aq is given by
V (accept Aq) = ln(cr) + β1Emax(V
u, V ps, V a | Aq) ,
and the acceptance probability, Pr(accept Aq), is therefore equal to
Pr(accept Aq) = Pr {ln(cr) + β1Emax(V u, V ps, V a | Aq) ≥
ln(cr + Cq) + β1Emax(V
u, V ps, V a | status-quo)}
for q = 1, 2, . . . , 12. The latter may be identified given knowledge of the difference between
ln(cr) and ln(cr + Cq), which we address in Section 6.2 below.
In what follows, we distinguish between the marginal intertemporal utility of accepting
a grant Gq (which reduces the cost of education) and the marginal intertemporal utility
of accessing a loan Lq. These quantities are formally defined as follows:
MVg,q = β1Emax(V
u, V ps, V a | Aq = Gq)− β1Emax(V u, V ps, V a | status-quo)
MVl,q = β1Emax(V
u, V ps, V a | Aq = Lq)− β1Emax(V u, V ps, V a | status-quo) .
and their parameterization are presented below.
6.2 Estimating the Marginal Utility of Consumption
In order to obtain the marginal utilities of financial aid, we need to obtain (and identify)
the marginal utility of consumption induced by accepting (and consuming) the cash pay-
ment. To achieve this we make use of a large number of binary choices (also incentivized)
between pairs of lotteries which all individuals needed to exert in the first portion of the
experiment. These have been used in recent papers (Belzil, Maurel, and Sidibé, 2021;
Jagelka, 2020).
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We make use of 30 binary choices following the popular Holt and Laury design with
narrow brackets. These may be described as follows. Each decision, indexed by l, re-
quires to choose between two lotteries Xl and Yl. In each case, the second lottery Yl is
unambiguously more risky then the second one.
The first lottery is characterized by a low payoff, x1l and a high payoff, denoted x2l,
while the second lottery entails a low payoff, y1l and a high payoff, denoted y2l. For each
lottery, the probability of the high outcome is equal to p2l and the probability of the low
outcome is p1l = 1− p2l.
In absence of any stochastic element, the individual selects the lottery that entails
the highest expected utility. That is the individual compares EU(Xl) with EU(Yl) where
EU(Xl) and EU(Yl) are given by the following
EU(Xl; θ) = p1l · ln(cr + x1l) + p2l · ln(cr + x2l)
EU(Yl; θ) = p1l · ln(cr + y1l) + p2l · ln(cr + y2l) ,
where cr is the background (reference) level of consumption. As the payoffs range from
$25 to a maximum of $96, we assume that the entire payment would be consumed before
higher education enrollment (over the period between the experiment and the start of
period 1) and ignore saving. In Section C of the supplementary file, we describe all
payoffs and probabilities.
We follow the literature and assume that choices are stochastic. Assuming logistic
errors, we obtain the following probability:
Pr(EU(Xl; θ) > EU(Yl; θ)) =
exp(p1l · ln(cr + x1l) + p2l · ln(cr + x2l))
exp(p1l · ln(cr + x1l) + p2l · ln(cr + x2l)) + exp(p1l · ln(cr + y1l) + p2l · ln(cr + y2l))
.
To capture heterogeneity in the marginal utility of accepting the cash payment across
individuals, we allow the reference consumption level to depend on the same heterogeneity
components of our model, namely type specific benefits and costs and write the reference
consumption level as follows:
cri = r0 + r
′
1 ·Xu + r′2 ·Xps ,
where r0 is an intercept term and r1 and r2 are column vectors of parameters.
With these estimates in hand, we can now recover the difference in period 0 utilities
of consumption. Ignoring potential savings in period 0, the difference in period 0 utilities
of consumption, denoted MU0,q, is equal to
MU0,q = ln(cr + cq)− ln(cr) .
The results, summarized in the first column of Table 7, indicate a relatively low level of
the reference consumption. The average and the median reference consumption levels are
around $10 and point toward a reasonable level of heterogeneity in the marginal utility
of consumption in period 0 as half of the population have a reference level between $7
and $13. In column 2, we report the distribution of MUi,0 corresponding to $300, as it
represents a cash payment representative of many decisions in the experiment. As should
be clear now, MUi,0 plays the role of the benchmark utility (marginal) level used to anchor
the lifecycle marginal utility of accepting financial aid and is the component of the model




6.3 Specification and Estimation of the Value of Financial Aid
Our objective is now to estimate the reduced-form of the marginal valuations of financial
aid in the experiment and decompose the ex-ante valuations obtained from the survey
into the same components so to investigate coherency. As documented in Section 5.3.4, it
is easy to compute marginal utilities of any financial aid offer using structural parameters
obtained from the survey. So, from now on, we introduce a superscript (s for survey and
fe for the field experiment), in order to distinguish MVg and MVl obtained from the
experiment and the survey. MU0 has no pendant in the survey so it does not need any
superscript.
In order to parameterize the marginal values of a grant (MV fei,gq , MV
s
i,gq) and a loan
(MV fei,lq , MV
s
i,lq
) we use 3 main elements: the estimated ex-ante probabilities of enrolling
in university and post-secondary education (Λui (·) and Λ
ps
i (·)) which both map all factors
onto a scalar expression, the monetary amount of the offer (either the grant or the loan)
and the set of all factors (the X vector). As financial aid offers apply either to university
or post-secondary, it is informative to consider the effect of the sum of both attendance
probabilities (Λui + Λ
ps
i ) as well as the effect of a binary indicator of whether or not an
individual has a higher probability of attending university than post-secondary (1(Λui >
Λpsi )).
We thereby obtain the following representations of the intertemporal marginal utilities:
MV ei,gq = g
′e
1 Xi + g
e
2 · (Λui + Λ
ps
i ) + g
e
3 · 1(Λui > Λ
ps
i ) +
ge4 · 1(Gq = $1000) + ge5 · 1(Gq = $2000) + ge6 · 1(Gq = $4000) for e = s, fe
MV ei,lq = l
′e
1 Xi + l
e
2 · (Λui + Λ
ps
i ) + l
e
3 · 1(Λui > Λ
ps
i ) +
le4 · 1(Lq = $2000) + le5 · 1(Gq = $4000) for e = s, fe
where ge1 and l
e
1 are both column vectors of parameters (including an intercept), and




2, . . . , l
e
5 are parameters to be estimated. The reference grant level is $500 and
the reference loan level is $1000.
To perform estimation of MV fei,gq and MV
fe
i,lq
, we first introduce an indicator, diq, which
is equal to 1 when individual i accepts financial aid offer q and 0 if not, and assume the
existence of a logistic random shock affecting additively the utility of accepting the cash.
We thereby obtain the following expression (to take the example where offer q consists of
a grant):
Pr{diq = 1} = Λ(β1[Emax(· | Aq)− Emax(· | status-quo)]−MUi,0,q)
= Λ(MV fei,gq −MUi,0,q) ,
where MUi,0,q is defined above, and where Λ(·) denotes the Logistic distribution function.












6.4 Estimates of the Value of Financial Aid
The distributions of the intertemporal marginal utilities obtained from the experiment and
the survey are summarized in Table 8. Individual valuations of grants disclosed within
the experiment (equal to 5.27 on average), are much higher than in the survey (equal to
0.09 on average) and the marginal utility of loans is also higher in the experiment (1.31)
than in the survey (0.05). It is however difficult to say more about these differences at this
stage since the location and scale of the marginal utilities estimated in the experiment are
benchmarked according the utility of consumption of period 0, which does not last one
full year period, and may therefore depend crucially on the reference consumption level.
On the other hand, valuations obtained from the survey are inferred from hypothetical
future payoffs which have no obvious connection to immediate (period 0) consumption
and which are expressed in reference to lifecycle consumption profile. We return to this
point in Section 7 but for the moment, these differences are not sufficient to conclude
anything about coherency. At most, can we observe that the average marginal utility of a
$2000 loan in the experiment, is below the marginal utility of a $300 cash payment (equal
to 3.44 in Table 7), despite that about 10% of the sample attributes a negative value to
a $2,000 loan and that, as indicated in Table 1, many individuals are actually willing to
sacrifice an immediate cash payment against a loan.
[Table 8 here]
In Table 9, we report the correlations between survey and experiment valuations for
a given type of financial aid and the correlations between grant and loan valuations for a
given setting (either the survey or the experiment). First, the correlations between grant
and loan valuations are relatively high in both the experiment and the survey. Either in
ranks or in level, they are between 0.9 and 1.0 and indicate that individuals with high
grant valuations seem to also have high loan valuations. However, the correlations between
survey and experiment valuations (either in rank or in level), and which are around 0.3 for
grants and 0.4 for loans, are much lower and suggest a disconnection between individual
valuations in the experiment and in the survey. This raise serious doubts about whether or
not choices in the experiment are coherent with both intentions and valuations disclosed
in the survey and leads us to investigate the reasons explaining this low level of coherency.
[Table 9 here]
The decompositions of grant and loan valuations into their determinants are found
in Table 10. The estimates obtained when decomposing the experiment valuations are
in columns 2 (grants) and 4 (loans). Those obtained from the survey are in columns 1
(grants) and 3 (loans).
[Table 10 here]
We first compare the effect of some determinant of a specific valuation obtained with
one data source with the effect of the same factor on the same valuation but estimated with
the alternative data source. For this sort of comparison, and for reasons aforementioned,
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it is much safer to focus our discussion on the signs of the parameters measuring the effect
of factors, rather than on their levels.25
First, in both the survey and the experiment, grant valuations increase with the ex-
ante probability of attending higher education and are higher for those who have a higher
probability of attending university than other post-secondary institutions, although the
magnitudes of the parameters are much higher in the experiment than in the survey.
As normally expected, our estimates also indicate that both grant and loan valuations
are increasing with the amount involved, but again, the impact is much higher in the
experiment. These results are therefore not problematic.
When examining the impact of the individual factors, it is intriguing to note that the
signs of many determinants (mostly costs and benefits) on valuations are not the same
in the survey and the experiment. For instance, in the case of grants (columns 1 and
2), the effects of 5 determinants (reported in bold in Table 10) switch signs between the
experiment and the survey. Those are the Monetary Benefits and Monetary Costs of
University, the Monetary Benefits and Non-Monetary Costs of Post-Secondary, and the
Information factor.
One major difference between the marginal utilities of loans and grants is the existence
of negative valuations for loans (documented in Table 8), as we find that about 10% of
the population attach a negative marginal valuations to loans. Nevertheless, the decom-
position of the marginal values of loans into ex-ante probabilities and factors (reported
in columns 3 and 4) disclose similar tendencies. More importantly, and as was the case
with grant valuations, we also find that 5 factors switch signs between the survey and the
experiment. Those are the Monetary Benefits, the Monetary Costs and Non-Monetary
Costs of University, the Monetary Benefits and Non-Monetary Costs of Post-Secondary
and are virtually the same that switched signs in the grant valuation (except for the Non-
Monetary Costs of University). However, the effect of the Information factor on loans
remains negative in the survey and the experiment, whereas it switched signs for grants.26
Overall, and to the extent that one is willing to attach more reliability to data obtained
in a high-stake context than in an incentive-free setting, these findings raise serious doubts
about the validity of self-reported components of the value of education and/or self-
reported enrollment intentions, as their impact on both grant and loan valuations differ
between the experiment and the survey. For this reason, we now turn to a more formal
analysis of the degree of coherency (or lack thereof) that may be detected and we discuss
some policy implications.
25In this paper, we ignore comparisons between loan and grant valuations (when obtained with same
type of data) as this sort of analysis would lie beyond the scope of the paper. As pointed out in the
theoretical literature, financial aid programs are likely to be subject to severe Moral Hazard problems
(Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2016) and there may be individual factors affecting loan and grant valu-
ations differently. As noted in Section 2, the valuations of loans and grants have practically never been
estimated structurally. The only published paper that we are aware of is Belzil, Maurel, and Sidibé
(2021).
26We also estimated the same model after excluding two decisions involving $700 because those are
more likely to be affected by savings than decisions involving smaller cash amounts. Most parameter
estimates were found to be very close. However, incoherency appeared to be as important as we found
an additional factor (the monetary costs of post-secondary) that switched sign between the survey and
the experiment.
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7 Estimating Coherency using a Confrontation Ap-
proach
While there are huge differences between valuations inferred from the survey and those
from the experiment, it is difficult to say to what extent those depend on the reasons
stated in Section 6.4. Evaluating the degree of coherency requires to avoid methods that
would depend too much on comparison of the location and scale of the cardinal utilities.
This is the main issue that we now address.
To evaluate the degree of coherency, we propose a rank-rank confrontation approach
based on regressing the rank of the valuations inferred from the survey and those from
the experiment on the ranks of the factors. Using ranks instead of cardinal utilities allows
us to circumvent the problems aforementioned. To achieve this, we use the following 4
regressions:
Rank(MV fei,g ) = R
fe′
g ·Rank(Xi) + error
Rank(MV si,g) = R
s′
g ·Rank(Xi) + error
Rank(MV fei,l ) = R
fe′
l ·Rank(Xi) + error
Rank(MV si,l) = R
s′
l ·Rank(Xi) + error ,
where Rank(Xi) denotes a vector measuring the rank of each factor (benefit, cost and






l are vectors of parameters to be estimated.
If individual valuations and intentions revealed in the survey are accurate, the mapping
from individual ranks in costs, benefits and factors onto valuation ranks should be the
same in the survey and the experiment. Our analysis is therefore based on comparing Rfeg




l . To facilitate comparisons, we estimate the experiment parameters
(the Rfeg and R
fe






In Table 11, we report the parameter estimates obtained for both the survey and the
experiment and indicate by a “reject” the determinants for which the null hypothesis
that the deviation parameter is equal to 0 is actually rejected. A rejection of the null
is essentially an indicator that the weight attributed to a given factor in the survey is
different in the experiment. In order to take into account potential heteroskedasticity
induced by conditioning on the distribution of factors estimated in the first stages, we
compute robust standard errors.
The results are striking. Focusing first on grant valuations, we find that equality is
strongly rejected for all parameters (excluding the intercept term). When turning to loan
valuations, the results are also spectacular. Except for 2 factors (post-secondary monetary
costs and financial constraint factor) equality is also rejected .
One interesting question is whether or not going from utility to ranks resolves the
inconsistencies in sign that we noted earlier. The answer is no. As for valuations measured
in utilities, the 5 factors that switch signs when regressing grant valuations (marginal
utilities) on factors also switch signs when using rank relationships. The results are
identical for loans. The same factors switching signs in Table 10 also switch signs when
using rank-rank relationships. These results raise an important issue, which is how to
obtain a measure of coherency.
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Focusing on grants as an illustration, this suggests using the difference in model fit





i,g ) − R̂fe′g · Rank(Xi))2, and the sum of





i,g )− R̂s′g ·Rank(Xi))2, in order to build the ratio of the
former by the latter. Perfect coherency would arise when the ratio is equal to 1 and the
overall degree of coherency decreases as the ratio approaches 0.
At the bottom of Table 11, we report our measure of coherency applied to experiment-
survey comparisons for grants and loans, with the parameters reported in the same table.
In both cases, the indicator is low. The ratio of 0.15 obtained for grants indicate that
the sum of square residuals obtained when using the survey parameters is about 6 times
higher than the unrestricted sum of squares. For loans, the coherency indicator, equal to
0.25, is slightly lower, but points again to a high degree of incoherence.
7.1 Absolute vs. Biased Incoherency
We now analyze the distinction between two types of incoherency: Absolute Incoherency
and Biased Incoherency. To measure Absolute Incoherency, we use the absolute difference
between the grant (or loan) valuation rank in the experiment and the corresponding
valuation in the survey (|Rank(MV feg ) − Rank(MV sg )| in Table 12). Biased Incoherency
is meant to measure the tendency to disclose a higher valuation of financial aid in the
experiment than in the survey (or vice-versa). To measure Biased Incoherency, we use an
indicator equal to 1 when the grant (or loan) valuation rank in the experiment exceeds the
grant (or loan) valuation in the survey (1(Rank(MV feg )−Rank(MV sg )) > 0 in Table 12).
We then use OLS regressions to decompose each measure on all factors.
[Table 12 here]
In order to obtain a general feeling about which type of incoherency is more pre-
dictable, it is sufficient to compare standard goodness of fit measures obtained for Ab-
solute and Biased Incoherency. There is overwhelming evidence that individual factors,
especially subjective costs and subjective benefits, have a much higher explanatory power
on Biased Incoherency than on Absolute Incoherency as the R squares of the Biased In-
coherency regressions (0.62 for grants and 0.60 for loans) are more than 6 times higher
than the Absolute Incoherency R squares (0.16 for grants and 0.09 for loans). Because
the notion of absolute incoherency does not allow us to uncover interesting relationships
with individual factors, we focus our discussion on Biased Incoherency.
This finding generates a first important remark about the nature of incoherency. The
tendency to be biased-incoherent cannot be represented by purely stochastic behavior
only since it appears to be strongly correlated with individual heterogeneity measured by
various latent factors.
We now take a deeper look and discuss the role of subjective costs and benefits.
University non-monetary benefits seem to have the strongest impact on the likelihood
to disclose a higher valuation of both loans and grants in the experiment than in the
survey, as it is found to increase Biased Incoherency (the estimate is equal to 0.2775 for
grants and 0.3388 for loans). To a lesser extent, those reporting high benefits to post-
secondary education are also likely to disclose incoherent choices. On the other hand,
some of the costs and benefit factors are found to reduce incoherency. This is the case
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with the factor measuring the monetary benefit of university which has a strong negative
impact on Biased Incoherency for both loans and grants.
It is also important to note that the incidence of incoherency may depend on the type
of financial aid. That is there are some factors which affect biased incoherency only with
respect to one type of financial aid. For instance, post-secondary monetary costs decrease
incoherency when choosing between grants and cash (the estimate is equal to -0.0573)
but increase it when loans are concerned (the estimate is 0.0217).
Let’s now consider the role of ex-ante enrollment probability. There is overwhelming
evidence that those with a higher ex-ante probability of attending higher education also
tend to display more Biased Incoherency. This is particularly true for loans as indicated
by the estimate equal to 0.7700. Put differently, this implies that those who report high
ex-ante attendance probabilities (who would normally need less financial aid) tend to be
those who disclose a higher valuation when faced with real financial incentives.
Among the 5 primitive factors, the information factor is the only one found to be
strongly correlated with the propensity to be incoherent. The estimates, equal to 0.2716
for loans and 0.3022 for grants, indicate that those who claim to be more informed also
tend to disclose a higher loan valuation in the experiment than in the survey. Abstracting
from the information factor, other primitive factors are much less correlated with incoher-
ence. For instance, the factors measuring cognitive skills and motivation in school reduced
biased Incoherency (after conditioning on costs and benefits). This is also true about the
locus of control factor which reduces slightly the likelihood of Biased Incoherency. Finally,
and after conditioning on costs and benefits, the financial constraint factor is found to
have no impact.
One convenient method to summarize and illustrate the incidence of incoherencies
is to compare the explanatory power of different groups of variables in the experiment
and the survey valuations using R squares obtained when the regression of Table 11 is
performed on specific subsets of determinants. This is achieved in Table 13 for different
grouping methods: (i) monetary vs. non-monetary determinants, (ii) university costs and
benefits vs. post-secondary costs and benefits, (iii) all benefits and costs vs. other factors,
and finally (iv) all benefits vs. all costs. Among all those groupings, the university vs.
post-secondary dimension is the most revealing one. The difference in R squares between
survey and experiment for both loans and grants implies much more weight on university
costs and benefits in the experiment valuations than in the survey, as the experiment R
squares are about 4 to 5 times those obtained for the survey. Similarly, there is strong
evidence that benefits and costs (when taken totally) are much more important in the
experiment valuations than in the survey. When taken separately, we also find a much
higher weight put to benefits in the experiment than in the survey. All those findings are
fully applicable to both grants and loans.
[Table 13 here]
8 Policy Implications and Conclusion
Modern micro-econometric research makes use of a wide variety of data but for the most
part, each study uses one of the following types: observational data, experimental (lab or
field) or survey data. One major difference between various data sources is the amount of
economic incentive involved. Because it is rarely possible to estimate the same parameters
36
(or distribution of parameters) with different sources of data, economists are not capable
of asserting whether or not structural parameters estimated with one data source would
be coherent with those estimated from another source.
As the quality of individual decision making may vary with the presence of economic
incentives involved, there are good reasons to question the validity of policy recommenda-
tions obtained in an incentive-free context. To see this, let’s reconsider the hypothetical
case where an economist is interested in evaluating ex-ante the impact of an expansion
in higher education financial aid on university vs. other post-secondary enrollments such
as 2-year colleges, but can only access data from the survey or from the field experiment.
Estimating the determinants of individual valuations (essentially the willingness to pay
for financial aid) could constitute a natural step as it should reveal if those who are will-
ing to pay more have a high ex-ante probabilities of attending 2-year colleges or a high
ex-ante probability to enroll in a university.
To achieve this, one way to proceed is to decompose individual valuations into sub-
jective costs and benefits of both university and other post-secondary curriculums, as we
did in this paper. When doing it using the survey, our estimates show that those endowed
with higher monetary benefits and costs of a university curriculum would benefit more
from financial aid expansion. However, estimates obtained in the experiment point to the
exact opposite, as those with higher cost and benefits of university attendance are those
benefiting less. While we agree that predicting what would be the impact of a new policy
may require more information than the valuation decompositions into costs and benefits
only, it is clear that the latter constitute valuable information. However, in this specific
context, it is impossible to reconcile the results obtained from the survey with those in the
experiment. Ex-ante policy evaluation of a potential expansion of the Canadian higher
education financial aid system may depend heavily on whether or not the data have been
obtained in an “incentivized” context.
Our findings raise an even more fundamental question. Given the existence of im-
portant incoherencies between survey data and field experiment data generated within at
most 2 weeks, which type of data would be more able to predict actual post-high school
economic outcomes? This is a research agenda that we plan to undertake in a near future.
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Tables
Table 1: Financial Details of the Decisions between Cash and Higher Education Financing
Packages
Cash Loan Grant Financial aid
Choices (in $) (in $) (in $) take-up rates
1 25 2000 - 0.46
2 300 2000 - 0.19
3 700 2000 - 0.06
4 300 1000 - 0.12
5 300 4000 - 0.30
6 25 - 1000 0.90
7 100 - 1000 0.84
8 300 - 1000 0.72
9 700 - 1000 0.46
10 300 - 500 0.43
11 300 - 2000 0.79




Note: The take-up rates refer to the fraction of students who have chosen financial aid.
Table 2: Attendance Probabilities, Intertemporal Utilities and Model Fit
University Post-Secondary
Attendance Lifetime Consumption Attendance Lifetime Consumption
probability utility equivalence probability utility equivalence
(in $ per year) (in $ per year)
Mean 0.66 50.6 63,500 0.31 48.8 53,173
St. Dev. 0.33 4.6 24,727 0.31 3.2 14,667
25th centile 0.39 47.1 45,121 0.02 46.5 43,152
Median 0.77 50.3 58,319 0.22 48.5 50,529
75th centile 0.98 53.4 74,651 0.53 50.9 61,002
Data (D19) 0.64 - - 0.32 - -
Data (D20) 0.74 - - 0.24 - -
Note 1: The utility of the outside option is normalized to the discounted sum of $34,000 over 20
years. The lifetime utility of the outside option is equal to 43.7.
Note 2: The consumption equivalence is measured at the amount such that its discounted sum over
20 years would equate the intertemporal utilities of university and post-secondary education.
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Table 3: The Importance of Monetary Costs, Financial Constraint, Market Information,
and Monetary Benefits on Life-cycle Consumption
Changes in lifetime consumption (in $)








Monetary Costs 15,603 20,299 - -
Financial Constraint 6,770 18,910 - -
Market Information -10,242 -34,841 - -
Monetary Benefits - - -33,557 -121,257
Note: Monetary values for each component are calculated using the difference between the average
consumption level in the population and the average consumption level obtained at the minimum (or
maximum) level of each specific factor when shutting down the impact of each determinant.
Table 4: The Effects of Monetary and Non-Monetary Components on Intertemporal Util-
ities and Enrollment Probabilities
Intertemporal utilities Enrollment probabilities
University Post-Secondary University Post-Secondary
Monetary Benefits -1.0% -3.8% -0.0523 -0.1978∗∗∗
Non-Monetary Benefits -6.2% -6.5% -0.3371∗∗∗ -0.2720∗∗∗
Monetary Costs 2.0% 1.1% 0.1185∗∗∗ 0.0573∗∗∗
Non-Monetary Costs 3.6% 3.7% 0.2110∗∗∗ 0.1847∗∗∗
Financial Constraint 0.8% 1.1% -0.0048 0.0180
Market Information -1.0% -1.8% 0.0313 -0.0449∗
Cognitive Skills -5.1% -3.8% -0.0899∗∗ 0.0672
Motivation in School -3.0% -1.6% -0.0818∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗∗
Locus of Control -0.7% -0.8% -0.0004 -0.0079
Note 1: Effects for each component are calculated using the average difference between the predicted
utilities (resp. enrollment probabilities) and the utilities (resp. enrollment probabilities) obtained at the
minimum (or maximum) level of each specific factor when shutting down the impact of each determinant.
Note 2: Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗ 10%.
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Marginal effects Marginal effects
University:
Monetary Costs (U) -0.0209 0.0194
Non-Monetary Costs (U) -0.0904∗∗∗ 0.0844∗∗∗
Monetary Benefits (U) 0.0515∗∗ -0.0479∗∗
Non-Monetary Benefits (U) 0.1097∗∗∗ -0.1019∗∗∗
Post-Secondary:
Monetary Costs (PS) 0.0229 -0.0250
Non-Monetary Costs (PS) 0.0918∗∗∗ -0.1007∗∗∗
Monetary Benefits (PS) -0.0415∗∗ 0.0451∗∗
Non-Monetary Benefits (PS) -0.1248∗∗∗ 0.1347∗∗∗
Individual Factors:
Cognitive Skills 0.0853∗∗∗ -0.0722∗∗∗
Motivation in School 0.0362∗∗∗ -0.0271∗∗
Locus of Control -0.0056 0.0088
Financial Constraint -0.0115 0.0031
Market Information 0.0000 0.0078
Note 1: The marginal effect is the effects of a one standard deviation increase in the factor on the
enrollment probability.
Note 2: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗ 10%.
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Table 6: The Welfare Gains of Providing Financial Aid
Panel A: Providing Free Higher-Education
Policies
Free Post-Sec. Free Univ. Free education
Welfare gain 0.1258% 1.1229% 1.2106%
∆ in Post-Sec. enrollments 0.0231 -0.0894 -0.0695
∆ in University enrollments -0.0200 0.0983 0.0801
Note 1: The welfare gain is computed from the % change in expected maximum utility reachable
from period 1.
Note 2: Free post-secondary and free university refer to policies providing an annual $4,000 grant or
loan for the tenure of each type of education. Free education refers to a policy that provides the same
annual amount for both post-secondary and university.
Panel B: Providing $2,000 Financial Aid Packages
Policies
$2,000 Grant $2,000 Loan
Welfare gain 0.1752% 0.0881%
∆ in Post-Sec. enrollments -0.0071 -0.0074
∆ in University enrollments 0.0091 0.0084
Note 1: The welfare gain is computed from the % change in expected maximum utility reachable
from period 1.
Table 7: The Utility of Consumption in Period 0
Reference Marginal
consumption utility ($300)
cri (in $) MUi,0($300)
Mean 11.34 3.4425
St. Dev. 6.33 0.5034
25th centile 7.08 3.1679
Median 10.15 3.4200
75th centile 13.18 3.7694
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Table 8: The Distribution of Intertemporal Marginal Utilities in the Survey and in the
Field Experiment: a $2,000 Grant and a $2,000 Loan
MVg MVl
(Grant = $2,000) (Loan = $2,000)
Survey Field Survey Field
Experiment Experiment
Mean 0.0937 5.2665 0.0472 1.3087
St. Dev. 0.0335 1.5992 0.0327 1.0541
5th centile 0.0467 2.6816 0.0019 -0.5110
25th centile 0.0705 4.2245 0.0239 0.6921
Median 0.0906 5.3419 0.0428 1.4986
75th centile 0.1126 6.3803 0.0642 2.0423
95th centile 0.1556 7.4715 0.1064 2.5655
Table 9: Correlations between Different Valuations
Correlations Level Rank
Between survey and field experiment:
MV feg and MV sg 0.3297 0.3374
MV fel and MV
s
l 0.4100 0.4158
Between grants and loans:
MV feg and MV
fe
l 0.9189 0.8915




Table 10: The Determinants of the Valuations of Financial Aid in the Survey and in the
Field Experiment
Dependent variable MVg (Grant) MVl (Loan)
Survey Field Survey Field
Experiment Experiment
Parameters Parameters
Intercept -0.0640∗∗∗ -1.4712∗∗ -0.0371∗∗∗ -1.9907∗∗
Monetary Costs (U) 0.0112∗∗∗ -0.2165∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ -0.1820∗∗
Non-Monetary Costs (U) -0.0049∗∗∗ -0.1062∗∗∗ -0.0059∗∗∗ 0.3415∗∗∗
Monetary Benefits (U) 0.0124∗∗∗ -2.1559∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗ -1.6261∗∗∗
Non-Monetary Benefits (U) 0.0004 1.7625∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 1.3191∗∗∗
Monetary Costs (PS) 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.1149∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.1302∗∗
Non-Monetary Costs (PS) 0.0051∗∗∗ -0.4541∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ -0.3608∗∗∗
Monetary Benefits (PS) -0.0098∗∗∗ 0.0284 -0.0104∗∗∗ 0.3675∗∗∗
Non-Monetary Benefits (PS) -0.0032∗∗∗ -0.1508∗∗ -0.0040∗∗∗ -0.2297∗∗∗
Cognitive skills 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.1989∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0098
Motivation in School 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.1552∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.2572∗∗∗
Locus of Control -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0906∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.1560∗∗∗
Financial Constraint 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.2758∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.2704∗∗∗
Market Information -0.0186∗∗∗ 0.1932∗∗∗ -0.0231∗∗∗ -0.0853∗∗
Enrollment Prob. (Λui + Λ
ps
i ) 0.0839




∗∗∗ 1.5634∗∗∗ 0.0319∗∗∗ 1.1041∗∗∗
Grant = $500 (reference) - - - -
Grant = $1,000 0.0235∗∗∗ 1.4052∗∗∗ - -
Grant = $2,000 0.0701∗∗∗ 2.2870∗∗∗ - -
Grant = $4,000 0.1616∗∗∗ 3.0118∗∗∗ - -
Loan = $1,000 (reference) - - - -
Loan = $2,000 - - 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0883∗∗
Loan = $4,000 - - 0.0678∗∗∗ 1.2972∗∗∗
Note 1: Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗ 10%.
Note 2: Determinants in bold are those for which the effect measured in the field experiment is of a















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: The Determinants of Absolute and Biased Incoherency
Type of incoherency Absolute Biased
|Rank(MV feg )− Rank(MV sg )| 1(MV
fe
g −MV sg ) > 0
Grants Loans Grants Loans
Intercept 91.4869∗∗∗ 56.7085∗∗∗ -0.1166∗∗ -0.4185∗∗∗
Monetary Costs (U) -2.7003∗∗∗ -3.1033∗∗∗ -0.1059∗∗∗ -0.0899∗∗∗
Non-Monetary Costs (U) 6.2972∗∗∗ 5.2658∗∗∗ 0.0140∗ 0.1237∗∗∗
Monetary Benefits (U) -5.2649∗∗∗ -7.6530∗∗∗ -0.2424∗∗∗ -0.3743∗∗∗
Non-Monetary Benefits (U) 2.6017∗∗∗ 4.0483∗∗∗ 0.2775∗∗∗ 0.3388∗∗∗
Monetary Costs (PS) -2.6313∗∗∗ -0.4757∗ -0.0573∗∗∗ 0.0217∗∗∗
Non-Monetary Costs (PS) 2.7227∗∗∗ -0.9541∗∗∗ -0.1441∗∗∗ -0.2302∗∗∗
Monetary Benefits (PS) 9.5488∗∗∗ 8.7160∗∗∗ 0.1431∗∗∗ 0.0867∗∗∗
Non-Monetary Benefits (PS) -0.8671∗∗ -2.9328∗∗∗ -0.0565∗∗∗ -0.1097∗∗∗
Cognitive 1.6973∗∗∗ 0.7038∗∗∗ -0.0414∗∗∗ -0.0895∗∗∗
Motivation in School 0.6457∗∗∗ 0.4487∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0587∗∗∗
Locus of Control 0.1754 0.6278∗∗∗ -0.0261∗∗∗ -0.0295∗∗∗
Financial Constraint 2.3981∗∗∗ 0.3758∗ 0.0079∗ 0.0208∗∗∗
Market Information 2.4643∗∗∗ 0.5194∗∗∗ 0.3022∗∗∗ 0.2716∗∗∗
Enrollment Prob. (Λui + Λ
ps
i ) -77.5547




∗∗∗ 6.1305∗∗∗ -0.1366∗∗∗ -0.0235∗∗
R square 0.16 0.09 0.62 0.60
Note 2: Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗ 10%.
Table 13: Relative Importance of Different Determinants in the Survey and the Field
Experiment
Grants Loans
Survey Field Survey Field
Experiment Experiment
Groups of variables R square R square R square R square
All monetary 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.18
All non-monetary 0.35 0.62 0.36 0.47
All university 0.15 0.63 0.15 0.52
All post-secondary 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.14
All benefits and costs 0.44 0.73 0.44 0.62
All other factors 0.60 0.41 0.61 0.33
All benefits 0.36 0.58 0.36 0.56
All costs 0.18 0.28 0.17 0.10
All determinants 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.73
48
Figures
Figure 1: Effect of Costs and Benefits Factors Ranks
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Supplementary Material for Online Publication
A Measurement of Factors and Higher Education En-
rollment Intentions
The vast majority of the questions are contained in the Student Survey and a few of them
are contained in the parental survey. The measurements are identified by the correspond-
ing question in the student and parental booklets. A large number of questions had to
be answered within an ordered discrete choice while others are coded as binary outcomes.
We now provide the details for each question.
A.1 Primitive Factors
A.1.1 Cognitive Skill
Question D1: In your last year of high school, what was your overall grade average, as
a percentage?
[90% to 100% / 80% to 89% / 70% to 79% / 60% to 69% / 55% to 59% / 50% to 54% / Less than 50%]
Question D2: How would you rate your ability to use a computer? For example, using
software applications, programming, or using a computer to find or process infor-
mation.
[Poor / Good / Very good / Excellent]
Question D3: How would you rate your writing abilities? For example, writing to get
across information or ideas to others, or editing writing to improve it.
[Poor / Good / Very good / Excellent]
Question D4: How would you rate your reading abilities? For example, understanding
what you read and identifying the most important issues, or using written material
to find information.
[Poor / Good / Very good / Excellent]
Question D5: How would you rate your oral communication abilities? For example,
explaining ideas to others, speaking to an audience, or participating in discussions.
[Poor / Good / Very good / Excellent]
Question D6: How would you rate your ability to solve new problems? For example,
identifying problems and possible causes, planning strategies to solve problems, or
thinking of new ways to solve problems.
[Poor / Good / Very good / Excellent]
Question D7: How would you rate your mathematical abilities? For example, using
formulas to solve problems, interpreting graphs or tables, or using math to figure
out practical things in everyday life.
[Poor / Good / Very good / Excellent]
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Numeracy Test Score provided by Statistics Canada: Over the day of the exper-
iment, a numeracy test provided by the Center for Education Statistics was ad-
ministered to all students. The test was based on the numerical component of
the International Adult Literacy and Skills Survey project undertaken by numerous
OECD countries between 1995 and 2005. It is the same test used in PISA inter-
national comparisons. The questions are meant to capture the capacity to perform
numerical calculations. Students received a score between 0 and 500, which is used
as a cognitive ability measure. We use its standardized value.
A.1.2 Motivation in School
For the next questions, think only about your last year in high school, that is your most
recent year there.
Question E1: During your last year in high school, about how many hours each week
did you spend on homework outside class, during free periods and at home?
[Zero hours / Less than one hour per week / 1 to 3 hours / 4 to 7 hours / 8 to 14 hours / 15 hours or more]
Question E3: I did as little work as possible; I just wanted to get by.
[Never / Rarely / Some of the time / Most of the time / All of the time]
Question E5: I was interested in what I was learning in class.
[Never / Rarely / Some of the time / Most of the time / All of the time]
Question E7: I completed my homework on time.
[Never / Rarely / Some of the time / Most of the time / All of the time]
Question E8: I thought that many of the things we were learning in class were useless.
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree]
Question E11: School was often a waste of time.
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree]
Question E13: How often did you cut or skip a class without permission? Was it. . . ?
[Never / Less than once a month / Once or twice a month / About once a week / More than once a week]
A.1.3 Level of Mastery (Locus of Control)
The next set of questions describes the way some people feel. After each statement please
indicate whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree.
Question G1a: You have little control over the things that happen to you.
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree]
Question G1b: There is really no way you can solve some of the problems you have.
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree]
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Question G1c: There is little you can do to change many of the important things in
your life.
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree]
Question G1d: You often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life.
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree]
Question G1e: Sometimes you feel that you are being pushed around in life.
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree]
Question G1f: What happens to you in the future mostly depends on you.
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree]
Question G1g: You can do just about anything you really set your mind to do.
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree]
A.1.4 Information about Labor Market
Question D23: In the last two years, has anyone at school helped you find information
about jobs you may be interested in when you finish all your schooling?
[Yes / No]
Question D24a: In the last two years at school, did you meet with a school counselor
about your future education or work?
[Yes / No]
Question D24b: In the last two years at school, did you complete a questionnaire to
find out about your interests or abilities?
[Yes / No]
Question D24c: In the last two years at school, did you obtain any information on
student financing, such as student loans or grants?
[Yes / No]
Question D24d: In the last two years at school, did you attend a presentation by people
working in different types of jobs?
[Yes / No]
A.1.5 Financial Constraint
Question K1: How important are low expenses (tuition, books, room and board) in
choosing a college or university you would like to attend?
[Not important / Somewhat important / Very important]
Question K2: How important is availability of a scholarship, or grant in choosing a
college or university you would like to attend?
[Not important / Somewhat important / Very important]
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Question K12: In the past 12 months, would you say that your family spent:
[More than they earned / As much as they earned / Less than they earned / I don’t know]
Question K13: Do you consider your personal level of debt to be a burden?
[Yes / No]
Question K14: Do you consider your family’s level of debt to be a burden?
[Yes / No]
Question K15: Have you personally saved any money to finance your education after
high school?
[Yes / No]
Question D10: I feel obligated to financially support my family while I am still in school.
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree]
Question D21: Is there anything standing in your way of going as far in school as you
would like to go?
[Several options listed, up to 3 can be chosen. We coded it as binary, with value 1 if “financial situation” was
chosen.]
Question Q5 (parental survey): Is your financial situation standing in your child’s
way of going that far?
[Several options listed. We coded it as binary, with value 1 if “financial situation” was chosen.]
Question Q6 (parental survey): Have you done anything specific to ensure that your
child will have money for further education after high school?
[Yes / No]
Question F3: What is your best estimate of the total annual income before taxes and
deductions for your entire family (including parents and other relatives living with
you) for 2007?
Question Q9 (parental survey): Would you say the total income, before deductions,
of all family members living in your household in 2007 was. . . ?
[The response is an interval of $10,000 (from less than $10,000 to $120,000 or more)]
A.2 Valuation of Costs and Benefits of Higher Education
For each of the following statements, respondents have to indicate how much they agree
with the following statement, separately for three types of post-secondary education:
• University,
• Community college or CEGEP,
• Trade/vocational school or registered apprenticeship.
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The “. . . . . .” in the questions below are replaced by each type of post-secondary education.
In our model, we use measures related to “University” to extract the costs and benefits
factors related to university, and the measures related to “Community college or CEGEP”
and “Trade/vocational school or registered apprenticeship” to extract factors related to
other post-secondary education.
Answers are picked among the following options:
[Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Uncertain / Agree / Strongly Agree]
A.2.1 Monetary Benefits
Question H1a: “People who get a . . . . . . education will make more money over their
lifetime than those who just get a high school education”.
Question H1i: “Although . . . . . . can be costly, I believe that I would make more money
in the long run”.
Question H1l: “I think that if I were to put the time and effort into getting a good
. . . . . . education, I would make a lot more money in the long run”.
Question H1p: “I am confident that a . . . . . . education would lead me to a better paying
job”.
A.2.2 Monetary Costs
Question H1f: “I’m not sure that a . . . . . . education would pay off even in the long run,
given how costly it is these days”.
Question H1r: “Given the high costs of a . . . . . . education and the time it takes to
complete it, you are really no further ahead financially than if you get a job right
after high school”.
Question H1t: “I am hesitant to undertake a . . . . . . education because of the amount
of debt I’m likely to accumulate by the time I graduate”.
Question H1w: “The costs of a . . . . . . education have become so high that they outweigh
any future financial benefits”.
A.2.3 Non-Monetary Benefits
Question H1d: “Getting a . . . . . . education will lead me to find work that I really enjoy
doing”.
Question H1v: “The best way to get a prestigious job is through a . . . . . . education”.
Question H1g: “If you want a rewarding career these days, you need a . . . . . . education”.
Question H1h: “People who have a . . . . . . education get jobs that are much more sat-
isfying”.
Question H1n: “I think I could find a rewarding job without a . . . . . . education”.
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Question H1s: “Good jobs can be found without a . . . . . . education”.
Question H1u: “You can learn enough about the real world without a . . . . . . education”.
Question H1x: “I don’t think I would ever find fulfilling work if I didn’t get a . . . . . .
education”.
A.2.4 Non-Monetary Costs
Question H1b: “I don’t feel that I am emotionally prepared to go to . . . . . . yet”.
Question H1e: “If I were to pursue a . . . . . . education, my friends would think that I’m
trying to be better than them”.
Question H1j: “If I pursued . . . . . . education, I’m afraid that it would confuse me about
“who I am””.
Question H1k: “I’m hesitant to pursue a . . . . . . education because it would create ten-
sions with the people I grew up with”.
Question H1m: “I’m hesitant to pursue a . . . . . . education because it would create
tensions between my parents and me”.
Question H1o: “I’m hesitant to pursue a . . . . . . education because I really don’t know
what I want to do with my life yet”.
Question H1q: “I don’t think that I have the correct mindset right now to tackle a
. . . . . . program”.
A.3 Higher Education Enrollment Intentions
Question D19: As things stand now, what is the highest level of education you think
you will get?
[9 options listed. We grouped them in three categories: No post-secondary education / University / Other
post-secondary]
Question D20: What is the highest level of education you would like to get?
[9 options listed. We grouped them in three categories: No post-secondary education / University / Other
post-secondary]
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B The Distribution of Primitive Factors and Subjec-
tive Benefits and Costs
B.1 Normalizations
In order to estimate the distribution of primitive factors, we use the following normaliza-
tions:
• For cognitive skill measurements, we set the loading parameter associated to the
Numeracy Test to 1 and the intercept to 0.
• For motivation in school, we set the loading parameter of measure E1 to 1 and the
intercept to 0.
• For locus of control, we set the loading parameter of measure G1a to 1 and the
intercept to 0.
• For labor market information, we set the loading parameter of measure D23 to 1
and the intercept to 0.
• For financial constraint, we set the loading parameter of measure K2 to 1 and the
intercept to 0.
The following normalizations are used to estimate the distribution of subjective ben-
efits and costs factors:
• For monetary benefits, we set the loading parameter of measure H1a to 1 and the
intercept to 0.
• For monetary costs, we set the loading parameter of measure H1w to 1 and the
intercept to 0.
• For non-monetary benefits, we set the loading parameter of measure H1d to 1 and
the intercept to 0.
• For non-monetary costs, we set the loading parameter of measure H1q to 1 and the
intercept to 0.
B.2 Empirical Estimates
As a first step, we estimated the distribution of the unobserved primitive factors. Ta-
ble B.1 discloses the correlation between the factors. Not surprisingly, we find that the
cognitive skill factor (CO) is positively correlated with motivation in school (MS) and
with the locus of control (LC), with correlations respectively equal to 0.448 and 0.335.
The liquidity constraint perception factor (FC) and the market information (MI) fac-
tors raise particular interest as they most likely never have been estimated using factor
model techniques. In general, the financial constraints factor (FC) tends to be relatively
weakly correlated with other factors. For instance, the correlation with motivation in
school is only 0.120. It is also practically orthogonal to the cognitive factor (the correla-
tion is -0.015).
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Table B.1: The Distribution of Primitive Factors: Correlation Table
Cognitive Locus of Motivation Labor market Financial
skills control in school information constraints
CO LC MS MI FC
CO 1.000
LC 0.335 1.000
MS 0.448 0.272 1.000
MI 0.122 0.130 0.170 1.000
FC -0.015 -0.154 0.120 0.053 1.000
The Market Information factor (MI) factor is positively correlated with both the cog-
nitive factor and the motivation factor (the correlations are 0.122 and 0.170). These
indicate essentially that those more likely to attend higher education tend to be more
informed about financial aid opportunities.
Table B.2 reports the correlation between the subjective benefits and costs factors, for
university (Panel A) and other post-secondary education (Panel B).
As normally expected, benefits and costs are negatively correlated. This is the case
for both university and post-secondary education.
The correlation between monetary benefits and costs, equal to -0.385 for university
and -0.218 for other type of post-secondary institution, as well as the correlations between
non-monetary benefits and costs, equal to -0.253 and -0.416, are found to be quite strong.
Overall, those reporting high benefits therefore also tend to be those expecting low costs
of education.
At the same time, those endowed with high monetary benefit expectations also tend
to be endowed with high non-monetary benefit expectations, as indicated by correlations
equal to 0.644 (university) and 0.561 (post-secondary). The correlations between mone-
tary and non-monetary costs tend to be even stronger (with correlations equal to 0.697
and 0.512).
Because our model assumes that primitive factors are mapped onto benefits on costs,
and because the latter are naturally seen as structural components of individual decisions,
it is important to evaluate to what extent qualitative benefits and costs are explained by
primitive factors.
In Table B.3, we report the standard deviation of each cost and benefit factor as well
as the standard deviation of each factor’s deterministic portion which is explained by the
primitive factors. By comparing each standard deviation, it is easy to determine to what
extent subjective costs and benefits may be viewed as separate factors.
The results validate our approach which consisted in allowing each cost and benefit
factor to be explained by its own unobserved heterogeneity. For all 8 factors, we find
that the primitive factors explain at most 50% of the total variation across types. In
some cases such as university and post-secondary monetary benefits, the primitive factors
account for at most 25%. In many others, they account for one third only.
In Table B.4, we also report the structural parameters of the function mapping factors
onto benefits and costs. Overall, the results are coherent with pure intuition. For instance,
motivation in school is found to have a positive impact on both monetary and non-
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Table B.2: The Distribution of Benefits and Costs: Correlation Tables
Panel A: University
Monetary Non-Monetary Monetary Non-Monetary
Benefits Benefits Costs Costs
MB (U) NMB (U) MC (U) NMC (U)
MB (U) 1.000
NMB (U) 0.644 1.000
MC (U) -0.385 -0.241 1.000
NMC (U) -0.251 -0.253 0.697 1.000
Panel B: Post-Secondary
Monetary Non-Monetary Monetary Non-Monetary
Benefits Benefits Costs Costs
MB (PS) NMB (PS) MC (PS) NMC (PS)
MB (PS) 1.000
NMB (PS) 0.561 1.000
MC (PS) -0.218 -0.012 1.000
NMC (PS) -0.220 -0.416 0.512 1.000




St. dev. St. dev.
University:
Monetary Benefits (U) 0.4952 0.1320
Non-Monetary Benefits (U) 0.6245 0.2289
Monetary Costs (U) 0.8033 0.3407
Non-Monetary Costs (U) 0.6923 0.3797
Post-Secondary:
Monetary Benefits (PS) 0.4057 0.1139
Non-Monetary Benefits (PS) 0.6678 0.1768
Monetary Costs (PS) 0.9744 0.2905
Non-Monetary Costs (PS) 0.8515 0.2401
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monetary benefits and a negative effect on non-monetary costs.
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Table B.4: The Mapping from Primitive Factors onto Perceived Benefits and Costs:
Marginal Effects
Panel A: University
Monetary Non-Monetary Monetary Non-Monetary
Benefits Benefits Costs Costs
MB (U) NMB (U) MC (U) NMC (U)
Cognitive skills 0.0595∗∗∗ -0.0301 -0.2293∗∗∗ -0.2480∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0205) (0.0252) (0.0225)
Locus of control -0.0026 -0.0055 -0.2170∗∗∗ -0.2672∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0187) (0.0234) (0.0212)
Motivation in school 0.2283∗∗∗ 0.3769∗∗∗ -0.1189∗∗∗ -0.2260∗∗∗
(0.0173) (0.0219) (0.0247) (0.0226)
Labor market information 0.0304∗∗ 0.0192 0.0585∗∗∗ 0.0830∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0179) (0.0206) (0.0191)
Panel B: Post-Secondary
Monetary Non-Monetary Monetary Non-Monetary
Benefits Benefits Costs Costs
MB (PS) NMB (PS) MC (PS) NMC (PS)
Cognitive skills -0.1777∗∗∗ -0.2400∗∗∗ -0.1398∗∗∗ 0.0012
(0.0153) (0.0134) (0.0147) (0.0108)
Locus of control 0.2235∗∗∗ 0.0959∗∗∗ -0.1903∗∗∗ -0.2753∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0117) (0.0131) (0.0103)
Motivation in school 0.1483∗∗∗ 0.2279∗∗∗ -0.0529∗∗∗ -0.0108
(0.0147) (0.0126) (0.0135) (0.0104)
Labor market information 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0447∗∗∗ -0.0048 -0.0241∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0109) (0.0116) (0.0090)
Note 1: The marginal effect is the effects of a one standard deviation increase in the primitive factor
on the cost or benefit factor, normalized by the standard deviation of the cost or benefit factor.
Note 2: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗ 10%.
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C Estimating the Reference Consumption Level from
Data on Lottery Binary Choices
Prior to exerting decisions between cash payments and financial aid, students were pre-
sented with a sequence of binary choices between two lotteries in which risk is objectively
stated. The strategy used by the designers of the experiment was a standard Multiple
Price List (MPL) design. It consists of choosing between a lottery with average payoff and
another one with extreme payoff, and identify the cutoff point where an agent switches
from the average to the extreme lottery. This approach, pioneered by Holt and Laury
(2005), is standard in the experimental literature to measure risk aversion, but it may
also be used to estimate individual reference consumption level.
Each risk aversion decision requires to choose between two lotteries, Xl and Yl. In
each case, the first lottery is unambiguously less risky then the second one. The first
lottery is characterized by a low payoff, denoted x1l and a high payoff, denoted x2l, while
the second lottery entails a low payoff, denoted y1l, and a high payoff, denoted y2l. For
each lottery, the probability of the high outcome is equal to p2l and the probability of the
low outcome is p1l = 1− p2l.
When estimating the benchmark consumption level, we make use of 27 decisions. Each
decision is summarized in Table C.5. The decision identifier found in column 1 corresponds
to the rank that each decision occupies in the original data file.
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Table C.5: Lottery Payoffs and Probabilities
Decision # x1l x2l y1l y2l p2l
49 32 40 2 77 0.1
50 32 40 2 77 0.2
51 32 40 2 77 0.3
52 32 40 2 77 0.4
53 32 40 2 77 0.5
54 32 40 2 77 0.6
55 32 40 2 77 0.7
56 32 40 2 77 0.8
57 32 40 2 77 0.9
59 24 30 1.50 57.75 0.1
60 24 30 1.50 57.75 0.2
61 24 30 1.50 57.75 0.3
62 24 30 1.50 57.75 0.4
63 24 30 1.50 57.75 0.5
64 24 30 1.50 57.75 0.6
65 24 30 1.50 57.75 0.7
66 24 30 1.50 57.75 0.8
67 24 30 1.50 57.75 0.9
69 40 50 2.50 96.25 0.1
70 40 50 2.50 96.25 0.2
71 40 50 2.50 96.25 0.3
72 40 50 2.50 96.25 0.4
73 40 50 2.50 96.25 0.5
74 40 50 2.50 96.25 0.6
75 40 50 2.50 96.25 0.7
76 40 50 2.50 96.25 0.8
77 40 50 2.50 96.25 0.9
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